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This Note examines recent legislative proposals for reform of the
Chevron doctrine' in federal administrative law and suggests an alternative
solution that sets more definite boundaries delineating the roles of courts,
agencies, and the public in questions of statutory interpretation. Part I of
this Note provides background information on the problem of determining
when courts should defer to government agencies on questions of statutory
construction. It asserts that past legislative proposals are a valuable
resource for addressing this problem. Part II uses the various opinions in
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon2 to
describe the interpretive confusion the Chevron doctrine has generated and
the disagreement it has provoked among Supreme Court Justices and in the
lower courts. Part III describes four major versions of Senate Bill 343,3
the 1995 Senate regulatory reform legislation, and examines how similar
statutory modifications to the Chevron two-step review process would affect
agencies and reviewing courts. Part IV combines elements of the specific
proposals made in Senate Bill 343 in an attempt to improve on the existing
Chevron doctrine by setting up a new framework for when a high level of
deference to agency statutory interpretations is appropriate. The proposed
system contains the following elements: (1) a specific part of the agency
rulemaking record devoted to the explanation of its chosen statutory inter-
pretation, (2) a limitation of judicial review of permissible interpretations
to those contained in the record, (3) placement of the burden for presenting
alternative interpretations on outside commenters to a proposed rule, (4)
broad deference to agency statutory interpretations that satisfy the new
procedural requirements, and (5) only prospective application of the new
requirements. If removed from the strict cost-benefit analysis requirements
elsewhere in Senate Bill 343, a new system for reviewing agency statutory
interpretations could address public concerns about government agencies'
power and discretion, yet prevent destabilization of the post-Great Society
regulatory state. The next time that regulatory reform resurfaces in
Congress is an opportunity to improve upon the decisionmaking processes
of both agencies and their reviewing courts.
I. Background: Agency Deference in the Courts and Congress
The American political tradition includes an almost continual thread
of distrust toward concentrations of government power, a distrust that even
predates the founding of the republic.4 In the post-New Deal era, the most
1. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
2. 115 S. Ct. 2407 (1995).
3. S. 343, 104th Cong. (1995).
4. See, e.g., MicHAEL F. HOLT, THE POLITICAL CRisis OF THE 1850s, at 211 (1978) (recounting
successful efforts by the Republican party during the 1850s to increase opposition to slavery by por-
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notable expansion of government power has been through the creation and
expansion of federal administrative agencies. 5 One could reasonably argue
that these agencies constitute a headless "fourth" branch of government that
violates the fundamental principle of separation of powers by mixing legis-
lative, executive, and judicial functions under one roof.6 While no one
seriously believes that modem agency functions could be handled directly
by Congress, courts, or the White House staff, there is an increasing
uneasiness over the extent of power assumed by government agencies.7
A. Defining the Problem
Of particular difficulty are those instances when an administrative
agency must interpret ambiguities in one of the statutes that Congress has
assigned it to administer. The judiciary, of course, is the final authority
traying it as an 'attempt of Southerners to pervert 'a republican Constitution [into] an aristocratic
one'"); ARTHURM. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY377-419 (1973) (finding a danger-
ous concentration of power in the Vietnam War and Watergate-era presidencies); HARRY L. WATSON,
LIBERTY AND POWER: THE POLITICS OFr JACKSONIAN AMERICA 44-45 (1990) (asserting that early
nineteenth-century Americans were "unduly suspicious, evenparanoid" about concentrations of govern-
mental power); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 150-61
(1969) (describing the emphatic belief in separation of powers that influenced the drafting of the first
state constitutions); see also Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE LJ.
637, 656 (1989) ("The American political tradition is, for good or ill, based in large measure on a
healthy mistrust of the state.").
5. See STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 1 (1982) (recounting how "the number
of federal regulatory agencies and the scope of regulatory activity vastly expanded" during the past
several decades). To administer the huge number of programs and agencies within the federal govern-
ment, a recent count found that the executive branch had 2,037,437 employees. Arleen Jacobius,
Lawyers Buck Do wsizing Trend: Executive Branch Workforce Being Reduced as Attorneys Are Added,
81 A.B.A. J. 24 (Nov. 1995).
6. See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, The Place ofAgencies in Government: Separation of Powers and
the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 573, 667 (1984) (arguing that agencies are a valid fourth
branch of government, but that recognizing them as such requires abandoning the traditional constitu-
tional interpretation of three branches alone); Peter Marra, Comment, Have Administrative Agencies
Abandoned Reasonability?, 6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 763, 783-85 (1996) (noting that the constitu-
tionality of administrative agencies would be questionable under a strict separation of powers doctrine
and observing that the modernjudiciary has been unwilling to enforce the separation of powers doctrine
against administrative agencies).
7. See, e.g., PHILIP K. HOWARD, THE DEATH OF COMMON SENSE 25-29 (1994) (arguing that the
advent of the modern regulatory state has created an extremely powerful, detailed, and unwieldy system
of administrative agencies that focuses on documenting complicated solutions to all conceivable
problems at the expense of flexibility and efficiency); Marra, supra note 6, at 769-70, 767 n.20 (noting
the inability of Congress to handle technical issues or issues that require ongoing supervision, and
stating that "today, agencies are individual mini-governments, encompassing the power of the
executive, the legislature and the judiciary"). The executive branch itself has recognized a problem
with both how governmentprograms are run and how they are perceived by the public. See AL GORE,
CREATING A GOVERNMENT THAT WORKS BErTER AND COSTS LESS: REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
PERFORMANCE REVIEW 1 (1993) ("Public confidence in the federal government has never been lower.
The average American believes we waste 48 cents of every tax dollar. Five out of every six want
'fundamental change' in Washington. Only 20 percent of Americans trust the federal government to
do the right thing most of the time-down from 76 percent 30 years ago.").
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on issues of statutory construction;' however, a lengthy and complex
statute such as the Clean Air Act9 or a broadly written statute such as the
Securities Act of 193310 may give rise to more interpretive disputes than
the federal court system could likely handle in a reasonable amount of
time."' Moreover, by enacting such enabling statutes-laws that authorize
certain agency programs or actions-Congress demonstrably intended to
leave a certain amount of discretion to the agencies to interpret and carry
them out. 2 If a reviewing court gives no deference at all to these inter-
pretations, much of the efficiency advantage of having executive agencies
is lost. Conversely, if a court gives absolute deference to the agency
interpretation, then it has violated the pronouncement in Marbury v.
Madison that "[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is. " "s The fact that the answer lies some-
where in the middle is obvious; precisely where in the middle is one of the
most difficult questions in administrative law.
After several decades of vague standards and often inconsistent
decisions in this area, the Supreme Court in 1984 appeared to clarify the
standard of judicial review in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc."4 The Court laid out a two-step process for deter-
mining the validity of an agency's statutory construction. First, if the
intent of Congress in enacting a statute is clear, then the court must ensure
that the agency has given effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress."5 If, however, a statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to
the specific issue, then a court must apply a second step and ask whether
8. See, e.g., FEC v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 31-32 (1981) (noting
that an interpretation of the Federal Election Campaign Act by the agency charged with administering
it "is entitled to deference, but the courts are the final authorities on issues of statutory construction"
(citations omitted)); FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 385 (1965) (finding that although
the Federal Trade Commission's judgment is to be given "great weight" in interpreting the Federal
Trade Commission Act, the words of the Act "set forth a legal standard and they must get their final
meaning from judicial construction"); Webster v. Luther, 163 U.S. 331,342 (1896) (noting the Court's
duty to determine the purpose of a statute, especially where "the practice of an Executive Department
... defeat[s] the obvious purpose of the statute").
9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1994).
10. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1994).
11. For example, in 1996 the total number of pages of regulations implementing the Clean Air Act
exceeded 6500. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 50.1-95.4 (1996).
12. See Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974) ("The power of an administrative agency to
administer a congressionally created and funded program necessarily requires the formulation of policy
and the making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress.").
13. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Judicial Review of
Administrative Action in a Conservative Era, 39 ADMIN. L. REV. 353, 368 (1987) ("Administrative
agencies are constrained by statute, that is, law, and the mere fact that the statute is ambiguous
shouldn't give the agency, of all people, the authority to decide on the meaning of the limitation.").
14. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
15. Id. at 342-43.
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the agency's interpretation is based on a permissible construction of the
statute. 6 Chevron, if read literally, is a broad grant of deference to
any "reasonable" interpretation of an agency-administered statute by the
administering agency. 7
In the years following Chevron, problems arose with the application
of its seemingly simple rule. In 1995, two events highlighted these
problems. First, on February 2, Senate Bill 343, entitled "The
Comprehensive Regulatory Reform Act of 1995," was introduced. 8
Second, on June 29, the United States Supreme Court handed down its
decision in Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great
Oregon. 9 The decision in Sweet Home illustrates the impracticality of
using the Chevron analysis to define the boundaries of the interpretive roles
of agencies and courts, and Senate Bill 343 illustrates an attempt by
Congress to redefine those boundaries and the difficulty Congress faced in
doing so.
The two-step Chevron analysis, while arguably clear on its face, has
given rise to such divergent interpretations that it may be of little practical
use in the future. Sweet Home, which involved the interpretation of the
Endangered Species Act by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service," demon-
strates the current problem of interpreting Chevron and suggests that the
doctrine as presently formulated seems doomed to failure. While both the
majority and the dissent in Sweet Home agreed that Chevron governed the
analysis of the case,2 the steps by which they each came to a final
decision were strikingly different, as were their diametrically opposite
results. Indeed, but for the similarity of the two sides' case citations, a
casual observer might believe that they were using completely different
standards of review.
In 1995, Congress considered modifying the standard of review.
Regulatory reform was a topic discussed at great length in the 104th
Congress, and the Comprehensive Regulatory Reform Act of 1995 was the
16. Id. at 843.
17. See id. at 865 (deferring to the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) interpretation of the
Clean Air Act because the agency's interpretation was reasonable in light of the competing interests
involved). By Chevron's own terms, however, this deferential review standard applies only to "an
agency's construction of the statute which it administers" itself. Id. at 842. For example, while an
EPA interpretation of the Clean Air Act (which the EPA administers) would be given substantial
deference, an EPA interpretation of the Occupational Safety and Health Act (which the Department of
Labor administers) would not be given deference. Cf. Robert A. Anthony, Which Agency
Interpretations Should Bind Citizens and Courts?, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (1990) (describing limits on
the application of Chevron deference).
18. 141 CONG. REc. S2056 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1995) (recording the introduction of S. 343 by
Senator Dole).
19. 115 S. Ct. 2407 (1995).
20. Id. at 2409-10,2410 n.2.
21. Id. at 2416; id. at 2421 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
1997] 1089
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centerpiece of the debate, proposing a dramatic overhaul of the federal
Administrative Procedure Act (APA).1 As introduced, Senate Bill 343
contained provisions for substantially changing the scope of judicial review
of federal administrative agencies' interpretations of law-a change in the
Chevron doctrine. The bill was referred separately to the Judiciary
Committee and the Governmental Affairs Committee. Both commit-
tees ultimately reported out favorably their own substitute versions of the
bill, which differed substantially from both the original version and from
each other.' A few months later, on the Senate floor and with the
consent of both committees, Senator Dole offered Amendment 1487, which
entirely replaced both of the committee substitutes and became the basis for
the remainder of the debate.27 The variety of the proposals presented in
these different versions28 of the same legislation illustrates the fact that
remedying the weaknesses of Chevron is no easy task. Senate Bill 343
went through countless changes during the legislative process,29 but its
evolution is best represented by the four major milestones of the Senate's
1995 debate on Senate Bill 343: (1) the introduction of the original bill, (2)
the bill as reported out by the Senate Judiciary Committee, (3) the bill as
reported out by the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, and (4)
Amendment 1487, the substitute amendment that replaced both committee
versions and became the basis for the bulk of the debate on the Senate
floor.
B. Using Prior Legislative Proposals to Find a Solution
Ultimately, no version of Senate Bill 343 passed the Senate because
of a threat of filibuster and a failure to obtain the necessary sixty votes to
cut off floor debate.' ° As the 104th Congress came to a close, regulatory
reform and statutory revision of the Chevron doctrine seemed to be a dead
letter. So why should the provisions of an unenacted regulatory reform bill
22. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1994).
23. S. 343, 104th Cong. § 628, 141 CONG. REc. S2059 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1995).
24. See 141 CONG. REc. S2034 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1995).
25. See id. at S2145 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1995).
26. See id. at D403 (daily ed. Mar. 23, 1995) (reporting on the bill by the Governmental Affairs
Committee); id. at D522 (daily ed. Apr. 27, 1995) (reporting on the bill by the Judiciary Committee).
27. See id. at S9509 (daily ed. June 30, 1995).
28. See infra Part Im for a discussion of differences among the four proposals.
29. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REc. S10,011-66 (daily ed. July 14, 1995). On one of the final days
of debate alone, seventy amendments to the bill were offered on the Senate floor. Id. The vast
majority of these amendments were ordered to lie on the table after submission and were never
considered by the full Senate. Id.
30. See id. at S10,400 (daily ed. July 20, 1995) (statement by Sen. Dole) ("I want to thank my
Republican colleagues and four of our colleagues on the other side who voted for regulatory reform
and congratulate those who stuck together to bury it. It seems to me they have been successful.").
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be of any interest to the legal community? Senate Bill 343 is worth
evaluating for at least four reasons. First, the current proposals for
comprehensive regulatory reform are the offspring of an idea that has
percolated through the halls of Congress since the mid-1970s, 3" and this
persistence suggests a greater possibility of eventual enactment than is
typically the case with "dead" legislation. It is accordingly more important
than usual to analyze and understand past regulatory reform proposals.
Considering the substantial changes in American law and society in the past
quarter century and the strong opposition that the idea of regulatory reform
has engendered in some circles,32 this staying power is remarkable.
Second, the idea that something is "wrong" with the American system
of administrative law is one that, justifiably or not, has resonated with the
general public.33 An observation about an earlier regulatory reform
movement is equally applicable to the more recent one: "It cannot be
intellectually dissected as an administrative law phenomenon without first
acknowledging its political reflection of the frustration and grass-roots
antipathy that federal administrative action has produced."' The
continued persistence of such frustration35 is why it behooves
31. See CynthiaR. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative
State, 89 COLUM. L. Rv. 452, 473-74 (1989) (discussing congressional attempts, beginning in 1975,
to increase judicial review of regulatory agencies' activities); James T. O'Reilly, Deference Makes a
Difference: A Study of Impacts of the Bumpers Judicial Review Amendment, 49 U. CIN. L. REV. 739,
747-67 (1980) (describing Congressional attempts to amend thejudicial review provisions of the APA
during 1975-1980).
32. See generally O'Reilly, supra note 31, at 754-67 (describing opposition to particular
regulatory reform proposals by members of Congress, judges, members of the executive branch, and
organized labor).
33. Professor McGarity criticizes the motives of the political leaders of the current regulatory
reform movement, but nonetheless finds that their topic has become pervasive:
The radical assault on regulation in the 104th Congress has had a powerful impact on
political discourse. More frequently than at any time since the first years of the New
Deal, the debate over the proper role of government in society has been a topic of
everyday conversation. In many ways, the scope of the debate is broader and the
divisions in attitudes deeper than at any time since the early 1890s ....
Thomas 0. McGarity, The Expanded Debate over the Future of the Regulatory State, 63 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1463, 1483 (1996).
34. O'Reilly, supra note 31, at 749.
35. Public dissatisfaction with federal regulation has been recognized by leaders in both major
political parties. See, e.g., GORE, supra note 7, at 1 (finding in 1993 an enormous public distrust in
the federal government as a mechanism to solve social problems). In his 1996 State of the Union
address, President Clinton twice declared that the "era of big government is over." Alison Mitchell,
State of the Union: The Overview, N.Y. TIMFS, Jan. 24, 1996, at Al. Public frustration with the
system is also echoed in some of Senator Dole's comments introducing Senate Bill 343:
This legislation represents a comprehensive effort to inject common sense into a Federal
regulatory process that is often too costly, too arcane, and too inflexible.
... Our agenda will restore the true balance between Government and individual
reflected in the 10th amendment, which leaves all powers not given to the Federal
Government to the States or to the people.
141 CONG. REc. S2056 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1995).
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administrative law scholars to consider the relative merits of the recent
reform proposals. If amendment to the Administrative Procedure Act
becomes more likely than not, those with administrative law expertise
should be prepared to help ensure the crafting of a workable and balanced
system that nonetheless takes account of the very real public concerns about
the reach of government. Even the fiercest foe of regulatory reform would
do well to analyze aspects of the current proposals to understand both their
constructive and questionable elements, because certain parts of them may
well be enacted into law. An informed scholarly community increases the
possibility that regulatory reform will be beneficial.36
Third, Senate Bill 343 and other proposals to modify the scope of
judicial review in the administrative context are important because they
address a fundamental means by which we balance our often conflicting
desires for efficiency and deliberative democracy 7 in the administrative
state. The Chevron doctrine is probably the most written-about and
debated subject in federal administrative law38 because it attempts to strike
a balance between these two desires. Senate Bill 343 would arguably have
shifted the balance. If one is concerned about the expansion (or limitation)
of power in the hands of government, a logical and time-honored way to
act on that concern is to tinker with the scope of judicial review.39
36. See Ronald M. Levin, Judicial Review and the Uncertain Appeal of Certainty on Appeal, 44
DuKE L.J. 1081, 1102 (1995) [hereinafter Levin, Uncertain Appeal] (suggesting that the scholarly com-
munity bears "an unusually large share of the burden" in clarifying scope of review doctrine). It
should be noted, however, that Professor Levin is not sympathetic to the view that Congress would be
the best institution to straighten out the doctrinal vagueness and inconsistency. Id. at 1091-95.
Professor Levin reiterated this view in a later discussion of Senate Bill 343. See Ronald M. Levin,
Scope of Review Legislation: The Lessons of 1995, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 647, 665 (1996)
[hereinafter Levin, Lessons of 1995] (contending that the 1995 regulatory reform legislation
"underscores some hazards" of modifying scope of review via Congress).
37. See Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in
Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 73 TEXAS L. REV. 83, 125 (1994) (describing deliberative
democracy as "a process by which members of society seek both to define the public interest and to
determine the best way to further that interest"). If all problems with transaction costs could be
avoided, a perfect deliberative democracy would have all citizens considering and participating in all
decisions. In the real world, the transaction costs inherent in such a process would make efficient
operation of government an impossibility. In contrast, placing final and unappealable decisionmaking
authority in the hands of one person would certainly be efficient, but it would leave no room for
citizens to participate in the democratic process.
38. For example, a search of the texts and periodicals database of Westlaw (TP-ALL) yielded 810
entries that at least allude to the Chevron instruction to give deference to agency interpretations of
statutes. The search used was "(CHEVRON W/30 DEFERENCE) & (CHEVRON W/30 AGENCI)
& (CHEVRON W/30 STATUT!)" (search conducted Mar. 17, 1997).
39. For example, dissatisfaction with a system of review in Equal Protection Clause cases that was
either "rational basis" or "strict scrutiny" led the Supreme Court itself to modify the scope of review
in some cases to allow for "intermediate scrutiny." See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 67-
69 (1981) (using intermediate scrutiny to evaluatea classification based on gender); Trimble v. Gordon,
430 U.S. 762, 767 (1977) (using intermediate scrutiny to evaluate a classification based on illegitimacy
of birth); see also 3 RONALD D. ROTUNDA& JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONsTITUTIONAL LAw:
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Variant readings of the Chevron decision have done this to a limited extent,
but a legislative attempt to modify or abrogate the doctrine could have a
much greater impact. Analysis of the 1995 regulatory reform legislation
can help us determine the relative values we assign to efficiency and
deliberative democracy in an important and pervasive part of our
government.
Fourth, and most significantly, the four versions of Senate Bill 343
actively considered by the Senate demonstrate a broad spectrum of
approaches for dealing with the Chevron doctrine, ranging from ignoring
it entirely (the Governmental Affairs Committee) to virtually abrogating it
(the Judiciary Committee). If it is at all possible for Congress to produce
a beneficial reformulation of the Chevron doctrine, perhaps such a proposal
may be found within these major permutations of Senate Bill 343. They
represent a range of legislative answers for those concerned with either
minimizing or maximizing the scope of power of administrative agencies
to interpret their own enabling statutes. It thus makes sense to examine the
past efforts of Congress in a field as politically and socially important as
administrative law in order to glean ideas for the future.'
In short, regulatory reform in the scope of review context is an
important and persistent idea on the American political and governmental
scene. It is not likely to go away any time soon, and it involves issues
fundamental to the American system of government. Legislation in this
area can be a learning experience on many fronts. Perhaps this examina-
tion and the proposals it produces can be a small step toward fixing the
problems inherent in the Chevron doctrine.
II. The Problem of Setting Agency Boundaries on Questions of Law
The Supreme Court and lower courts have encountered difficulty in
defining exactly when a court should defer to an agency's construction of
its own enabling statute. The Chevron doctrine has given rise to at least
two distinct interpretive camps. These two camps can reach completely
opposite results depending on how or if they utilize canons of statutory
construction. The confusion surrounding canons of construction is
arguably the single largest impediment to the usefulness of Chevron as it
is presently formulated.4' The checkered history of and multiple opinions
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 18.3, at 16-19 (2d ed. 1992) (describing situations in which the Court
has engaged in an independent analysis of legislative judgment that is less deferential than the rationality
test, but something less than strict scrutiny).
40. See Levin, Lessons of 1995, supra note 36, at 648 (asserting that congressional scope of
review proposals deserve comment because "Congress will undoubtedly revisit the subject of regulatory
reform before long").
41. See infra subpart H(A).
1997] 1093
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in Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon
serve to illustrate this point in colorful detail .42
A. The Chevron Doctrine and Canons of Construction
The Supreme Court allegedly laid to rest-or at least simplified-the
question of deference to statutory interpretation by administrative agencies
in its opinion in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. Chevron ostensibly set up a two-step test to be applied to all
attempts by agencies to construct the meaning of the statutes they
administer. The first step looks entirely to congressional intent, asking
"whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue."I
If the court finds clear congressional intent, then the analysis ends because
the court, just like the agency, must give effect to "the unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress."' The second step of the Chevron test
addresses the situation in which an agency's enabling statute is ambiguous.
In such a case, the court is to determine whether the agency's interpretation
is "based on a permissible construction of the statute" and uphold any
permissible interpretation by the agency.45
The Chevron two-step test sounds simple, but the Supreme Court itself
has often split over whether to apply the two-step analysis in a way that
grants the full amount of deference implied by a literal reading of the
opinion's text.' The dispute revolves around when and to what extent a
reviewing court should use traditional canons of statutory construction in
step one of the test. A statute may not be clear on its face, but a court
could "find" clear congressional intent by applying a variety of interpretive
tools. Should a court do that when judging an agency-administered statute?
A look at the opinions by Justices Stevens and Scalia in a "Chevron
case" illustrates the intellectual foundation of the dispute over the canons
of statutory construction. In Immigration and Naturalization Service v.
Cardoza-Fonseca,47 the Supreme Court examined the INS interpretation
of two statutory provisions that establish standards through which an other-
wise deportable alien may claim asylum.4" The INS argued that the two
42. See infra subpart 11(B).
43. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).
44. Id. at 843.
45. Id.
46. See Thomas 0. Sargentich, The Scope ofJudicialReview ofIssues ofLaw: Chevron Revisited,
6 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 277, 279 (1992) (finding a major debate between judges who would move
quickly to step-two deference and those who would not).
47. 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
48. Id. at 423 (comparing the Immigration and Nationality Act § 243(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)
(1994), with the Refugee Act of 1980 § 208(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1994)).
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provisions, although worded differently, were substantively identical 9
Citing Chevron, Justice Stevens announced that by "[e]mploying traditional
tools of statutory construction," the Court had determined that Congress
did not intend the two statutory standards to be identical.' Hence, the
statutory interpretation by the INS was rejected because the case presented
"a pure question of statutory construction for the courts to decide,"51 and
the Court's interpretation was inconsistent with the agency's. Thus, the
agency's view lost under step one of Chevron.
Notably, Justice Stevens was also the author of Chevron. The
reference to "traditional tools of statutory construction" invokes a footnote
in the Chevron opinion that is the main bone of contention over what the
Court meant in its step-one discussion of "the unambiguously expressed
intent of Congress."52 Footnote nine of Chevron says:
The judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction
and must reject administrative constructions which are contrary to
clear congressional intent. If a court, employing traditional tools of
statutory construction, ascertains that Congress had an intention on
the precise question at issue, that intention is the law and must be
given effect.
53
This footnote, along with Justice Stevens's reasoning in Cardoza-Fonseca,
illustrates the rationale behind readings of Chevron that tend to be less
deferential to agencies. The so-called "traditional tools of statutory
construction" are to be applied by the reviewing court in Chevron step one
to determine congressional intent. Only if that exercise turns up ambiguity
in the meaning of the statute is step two (deference to a reasonable inter-
pretation by the agency) to be applied. In other words, this approach relies
substantially on canons of statutory construction and nontextual indicators
of congressional intent when applying step one, and it seems to move to
step-two deference only if this examination is to no avail. The Stevens
approach thus includes some significant reluctance to find that a statutory
ambiguity exists that would require deference to the agency under step two
of Chevron.
In his concurring opinion in Cardoza-Fonseca, Justice Scalia castigated
the majority's approach, and in so doing laid out the rationale behind a
highly deferential reading of Chevron. While agreeing that the INS's inter-
pretation of the Immigration and Nationality Act was inconsistent with the
plain meaning of the Act, Justice Scalia criticized the Court's discussion of
49. Id. at 430.
50. Id. at 446.
51. Id.
52. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 83 7, 843 (1984).
53. Id. at 843 n.9 (citations omitted).
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deference-a concept from step two of Chevron-in a decision that pur-
ported to be based on step one: "[T]here is simply no need and thus no
justification for a discussion of whether the interpretation is entitled to
deference. " '4 Thus, clear intent should have precluded any consideration
of whether the INS interpretation was reasonable. Justice Scalia further
disputed the notion "that courts may substitute their interpretation of a
statute for that of an agency whenever, '[e]mploying traditional tools of
statutory construction,' they are able to reach a conclusion as to the proper
interpretation of the statute."' He found that a court's determining the
reasonableness of an agency's statutory interpretation by reference to tools
of statutory construction would be "not an interpretation but an evisceration
of Chevron." 6 This version of step one would examine only the text of
the statute to determine congressional intent, but if the text were ambig-
uous, step-two deference would be applied. Justice Scalia ignored footnote
nine altogether as an aberration from the main command of Chevron.57
Both of these approaches to Chevron have inherent problems.
Possibly the most famous demonstration of the weakness of statutory
construction canons of the type used by Justice Stevens appears in a 1950
article by Karl Llewellyn.58 Professor Llewellyn compiled a two-column
list for the purpose of showing that "there are two opposing canons on
almost every point" when interpreting a statute.59 Thus, to justify a
desired result, one need only invoke the appropriate canon. The outcome
using the "traditional tools of statutory construction" therefore depends
largely on who gets to choose the tools. On the other hand, Justice
Scalia's approach has its defects and detractors as well. Professor Pierce
has agreed with Scalia's call for applying strong Chevron deference,' but
has been a sharp critic of his "hypertextual" approach to step one, 1
54. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 453 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-
43 ("If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter, for the court, as well as the agency,
must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.")). It is noteworthy that after
quoting the aforementioned passage from Chevron, Justice Scalia's opinion contains a "footnote
omitted" notation. That notation is his own omission of footnote 9-the reference to "traditional tools
of statutory construction." Id. at 843 n.9.
55. Id. at 454 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
56. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
57. See supra note 54.
58. Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons
About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950).
59. Id. at 401.
60. See 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE
§ 3.6 (3d ed. 1994) (endorsing Justice Scalia's recommendation in Cardoza-Fonseca that the Court
should exercise a high level of deference towards administrative action under Chevron).
61. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court's New Hypertextualism: An Invitation to
Cacophony andIncoherence in the Administrative State, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 749,776 (1995) (asserting
that hypertextualism in the Supreme Court will serve to "maximize the workload of lawyers, judges,
and agencies, and to minimize the coherence and efficacy of agency-administered programs").
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finding that it allows courts too much leeway to ignore contrary evidence
of congressional intent.' In a given case, the intent of Congress may be
clarified by reference to legislative history outside the statutory text,' but
Justice Scalia would not allow such references.' Professor Farina has
criticized the strongly deferential reading of Chevron for creating a much
greater risk of abuse of authority by the executive branch.' The validity
of such a criticism increases or decreases depending on how much judicial
deference one thinks the case is mandating.
An inherent structural problem with the Chevron opinion, then, is that
it provides substantial support for at least two conflicting scopes of judicial
review. Under the Stevens approach, courts play an active role in finding
"clear" congressional intent and are more willing to uphold or overturn an
agency on the basis of step one of Chevron. Under the Scalia approach,
the role of the courts in step one is limited to examining the text of the
statute in determining congressional intent. If that exercise turns up
ambiguity, step-two deference to a reasonable interpretation is warranted.
In Cardoza-Fonseca, the dispute over how to review the agency's statutory
interpretation led to no substantive difference in the final outcome. The
next subpart of this Note shows dramatically that this is not always the
case.
B. Sweet Home: Illustrating the Anarchy
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon
illustrates the uncertainty and peril of relying upon Chevron as a means for
defining when courts should defer to agencies on questions of statutory
construction. Two statutory provisions formed the textual basis of the
agency interpretation at issue in Sweet Home. Section 9(a)(1) of the
Endangered Species Act (ESA) provides protection for endangered species
by making it unlawful to "take any such species within the United States
or the territorial sea of the United States."' The word "take" is a term
of art defined in section 3(19) of the ESA as "to harass, harm, pursue,
hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage
62. Id. at 763 (criticizing the Court's willingness to find textual "plain meaning" that is contrary
to otherwise overwhelming evidence of Congress's intent).
63. See, e.g., Bank One Chicago v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 116 S. Ct. 637, 644 (1996)
(Stevens, J., concurring) (claiming that reference to legislative history can help "find the answer to an
otherwise puzzling aspect of the statutory text").
64. See id. at 645 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("In my view a law means what its text most
appropriately conveys, whatever the Congress that enacted it might have 'intended.' The law is what
the law says, and we should content ourselves with reading it rather than psychoanalyzing those who
enacted it." (emphasis in original)).
65. See Farina, supra note 31, at 523-26 (arguing that Chevron creates a greater imbalance of
power within the federal government).
66. Endangered Species Act § 9(a)(1)(B), 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (1994).
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in any such conduct."67  On the authority of these sections, the
Department of the Interior (through the Fish and Wildlife Service)
promulgated the following regulation:
Harm in the definition of "take" in the Act means an act which
actually kills or injures wildlife. Such act may include significant
habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures
wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns,
including breeding, feeding or sheltering.68
Thus, all activities encompassed in the regulatory definition of "harm"
were included in the statutory definition of "take" and therefore were
illegal under section 9(a)(1).
The plaintiffs in Sweet Home were small "landowners, logging
companies, and families dependent on the forest products industries."'
Their complaint alleged economic injury on the basis of the Fish and
Wildlife Service's application of the "harm" regulation to the red-cockaded
woodpecker and the spotted owl so as to prevent modification or degrada-
tion of specific forest habitats of those species .'o The plaintiffs challenged
the regulation on several grounds, but only the Chevron issue will be
addressed here. Table 1 summarizes the divergent findings of the courts
and judges involved in this litigation:"'
TABLE 1
Summary of the Chevron Rationales and Outcomes in the Sweet Home Litigation
(* denotes an opinion on the prevailing side)
Deciding 1 Chosen
Court Opinion by Chevron Doctrine Basis for Decision Outcome
D.C. District Judge Step one (clear intent from the statute); but in the Regulation
Cour Johnson*7 ' alternative, step two (reasonable interpretation of upheld.
statutory ambiguity).
67. Id. § 3(19), 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19).
68. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1995).
69. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or., 115 S. Ct. 2407, 2410
(1995).
70. Id.
71. The Table does not include Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion because it did not address
the Chevron issue of statutory interpretation. See id. at 2418-21 (O'Connor, J., concurring). It instead
disputed Justice Scalia's characterization of the breadth and applicability of the regulation. See id.
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
72. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or. v. Lujan, 806 F. Supp. 279, aff'd sub
nom. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or. v. Babbitt, 1 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1993),
rev'd on reh'g, 17 F.3d 1463 (1994), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 2407 (1995).
73. Id. at 285, 287.
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D.C. Chief Judge Step two (reasonable interpretation of statutory Regulation
Circuit7' Mikva*75  ambiguity). upheld.
Judge Step one (clear intent from the statute). Regulation
Willianms*7 ' upheld.
Judge Step two (unreasonable interpretation of statutory Regulation
Sentelle 7  ambiguity). invalid.
D.C. Circuit Chief Judge Step two (reasonable interpretation of statutory Regulation
(rehearing) 7' Mikva79  ambiguity). valid.
Judge Step one (against clear intent from the statute); but Regulation
Williams * " in the alternative, step two (unreasonable overturned.
interpretation of statutory ambiguity).
Judge Step one (against clear intent from the statute). Regulation
Sentelle*h' overturned.
Supreme Justice Step two (reasonable interpretation of statutory Regulation
Court Stevens*' ambiguity). upheld.
Justice Step one (clear intent from the statute). Regulation
Scaliau invalid.
In the trial, the district court found that the language, structure, and history
of the ESA revealed that Congress intended an expansive interpretation of
the word "take," and that the term included habitat modification.' The
court also said that if it "were somehow to find the ESA 'silent or
ambiguous' with respect to this issue, it would nevertheless uphold the
74. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or. v. Babbitt, 1 F.3d I (D.C. Cir. 1993),
rev'd on reh'g, 17 F.3d 1463 (1994), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 2407 (1995). The opinion of the court was a
short per curiam opinion that included no rationale. Id. at 3.
75. Id. at 11 (Mikva, C.J., concurring).
76. Id. (Williams, J., concurring). This chart classifies Judge Williams's opinion as falling within
step one, because of his reliance on Congress's "clear intent." However, the opinion also discusses
whether the ESA amendments "support the inference" that the statute forbids habitat modification,
suggesting a step-two analysis. Because the opinion is a short one that does not actually mention
Chevron by name, Judge Williams may have either ignored Chevron or else collapsed its two steps into
one. Thanks go to Sarah Donch for pointing out this ambiguity to me.
77. Id. at 12-13 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
78. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or. v. Babbitt, 17 F.3d 1463 (1994), rev'd,
115 S. Ct. 2407 (1995).
79. Id. at 1476-78 (Mikva, C.J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 1465, 1467, 1472.
81. Id. at 1473 (Sentelle, J., concurring).
82. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or., 115 S. Ct. 2407 (1995).
83. Id. at 2416, 2418.
84. Id. at 2422-23, 2431 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
85. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or. v. Lujan, 806 F. Supp. 279, 283
(D.D.C. 1992), affd sub nom. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or. v. Babbitt, 1 F.3 d
1 (D.C. Cir. 1993), rev'd on reh'g, 17 F.3d 1463 (D.C. Cir. 1994), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 2407 (1995).
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Secretary's regulation as a reasonable interpretation of the statute."86
Thus, the court upheld the regulation under step one of Chevron (clear
congressional intent), but would also have upheld it under step two
(reasonableness of the interpretation in the face of ambiguity)."
On appeal, a three-judge panel of the D.C. Circuit affirmed the district
court's finding that the "harm" regulation was valid, but did so in a short
per curiam opinion that included no rationale.88 In a concurrence, Chief
Judge Mikva indicated that he upheld the regulation under step two of
Chevron as a "reasonable construction of the statute"8 9 given the fact that
the "take" definition in the statute is "generally ambiguous."' Judge
Williams, on the other hand, apparently decided to uphold the regulation
under step one of Chevron, discerning that congressional intent "forbids
some such incidental takings, including some habitat modification," but he
did so solely on the basis of the 1982 amendments to the Act, which
created incidental takings permits.91 Judge Sentelle, while finding that
ambiguity existed in the statute, dissented on the basis of step two of
Chevron, determining that the Interior Department's interpretation of the
ESA was not reasonable. 92
Judge Sentelle cited two canons of statutory construction as evidence
of the agency's interpretive unreasonableness: noscitur a sociis and the
presumption against surplusage.' First, the principle of noscitur a sociis
suggests that a word may be known by the company it keeps and "in
practical application means that a word may be defined by an
accompanying word."' Under the facts of Sweet Home, Sentelle found
that "all the other terms among which 'harm' finds itself keeping company
relate to an act which a specifically acting human does to a specific
individual representative of a wildlife species." 95 Thus, although the term
"harm" is broad, he believed that its context did not allow it to include
habitat modification. Second, the presumption against surplusage implies
that "[a] statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its
provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or
86. Id. at 285 (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 843 (1984)).
87. Id.
88. Sweet Home, I F.3d at 3.
89. Id. at 8 (Mikva, C.J., concurring).
90. Id. at 10 (Mikva, C.J., concurring).
91. Id. at 11 (Williams, J., concurring).
92. Id. at 12 (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (arguing that the court "cannot cram the agency's huge
regulatory definition into the tiny crack of ambiguity Congress left").
93. Id. at 12-13 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
94. 2A NoRMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.16 (5th ed. 1992).
95. Sweet Home, 1 F.3d at 12 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
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insignificant."' According to Judge Sentelle, the agency's statutory
interpretation should not stand because it "renders superfluous everything
else in the definition of 'take.'" ' Both noscitur a sociis and the
presumption against surplusage are prime examples of the "traditional tools
of statutory construction" permitted by the Supreme Court in Chevron.9
After granting a petition for rehearing, the D.C. Circuit altered its
opinion and reversed the District Court, finding that the "harm" regulation
failed under both prongs of Chevron as being neither clearly intended by
Congress nor a reasonable interpretation of the statute.' Judge Williams,
who was joined by Judge Sentelle, wrote the new opinion for the court
while Chief Judge Mikva wrote a dissenting opinion. Judge Williams,
having changed his mind about the impact of the 1982 amendments to the
ESA, found the application of noscitur a sociis to preclude the expansive
definition of "harm" promulgated by the Fish and Wildlife Service."00
Judge Sentelle concurred, but noted that he would not have resorted
to any use of legislative history because the meaning of the statutory term
"take" is "sufficiently clear" based on the language and structure of the
act. 10 Notably, a finding of textual clarity seems to invoke step one of
Chevron, rather than step-two's examination of reasonableness, contrary to
Judge Sentelle's original opinion. Additional confusion as to the exact
Chevron grounds for his concurrence arises from the fact that Sentelle
made no mention of Chevron whatsoever in this second opinion. Chief
Judge Mikva based his dissent on advocacy of the same broad Chevron
deference under step two" that he had advocated in his original opinion.
Given the multiplicity of views reported from the lower courts on the facts
of this single case, perhaps no case called for a clarification of the Chevron
doctrine from the Supreme Court as much as this one did. It was not
forthcoming.
The Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit and upheld the Interior
Department's interpretation of "harm" in the ESA. 1°( Given the obvious
disagreement below over the meaning of the statute, the Court easily could
96. SINGER, supra note 94, § 46.06 (citations omitted).
97. Sweet Home, 1 F.3d at 13 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
98. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9
(1984).
99. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or. v. Babbitt, 17 F.3d 1463, 1464 (D.C.
Cir. 1994), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 2407 (1995).
100. Id. at 1464-65.
101. Id. at 1473 (Sentelle, J., concurring).
102. Id. at 1473-74 (Mikva, C.J., dissenting) ("Surely the statute is silent, or at best ambiguous,
on this question.... Under step two [of Chevron], the only question is whether the FWS's
interpretation of the word 'harm' constitutes a 'permissible' reading of the ambiguous language.").




have required the highly deferential application of Chevron used by Chief
Judge Mikva. Alternatively, it could have seized the opportunity to explic-
itly adopt a lower deference standard. The Sweet Home Court did neither.
The Court, in both the majority and the dissent, instead further demon-
strated the instability of the doctrine by detouring into a disconcertingly
varied use of "traditional tools of statutory construction."
Justice Stevens's opinion for the majority, when read along with the
opinions of the D.C. Circuit, demonstrates a persistent weakness in the use
of canons of statutory construction-the possibility of diametrically opposed
results. As mentioned previously, Karl Llewellyn's two-column list of
opposing canons demonstrated this weakness almost a half-century ago."°
For purposes of the Sweet Home case, the two canons in item twenty-one
of Llewellyn's list are noteworthy: "General terms are to receive a general
construction," and general terms "may be limited by specific terms with
which they are associated or by the scope and purpose of the statute."105
The Supreme Court went a step further than Llewellyn's opposing canons
and found contradictory results from the same canons relied upon by the
D.C. Circuit. Noscitur a sociis still suggested, as it did for the lower
court, that a word "gathers meaning from the words around it.""°
However, rather than finding this canon to require a restrictive meaning of
the term "harm," the Court said that "[tihe statutory context of 'harm'
suggests that Congress meant that term to serve a particular function in the
ESA, consistent with but distinct from the functions of the other verbs used
to define 'take.'""17 As to the presumption against surplusage, the Court
turned Judge Sentelle's reasoning (that terms in a definition should be given
consistent meanings)0 8 on its head and determined that "unless the
statutory term 'harm' encompasses indirect as well as direct injuries, the
word has no meaning that does not duplicate the meaning of other words
that section 3 uses to define 'take.'"" Thus, Justice Stevens found that
terms in a definition should be given inconsistent meanings.
In dissent, Justice Scalia found under Chevron's step one that
Congress clearly did not intend to authorize a regulation as broad as the
one promulgated by the Fish and Wildlife Service. "There is neither
textual support for," he said, "nor even evidence of congressional
consideration of" the interpretation of the ESA upheld by the Court." °
104. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
105. Llewellyn, supra note 58, at 405.
106. Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2415 (quoting Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307
(1961)).
107. Id.
108. See text accompanying notes 96-97.
109. Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2413.
110. Id. at 2431 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Under his analysis, which included a reference to the noscitur a sociis
canon analogous to Judge Sentelle's opinion below,"' the regulation
should be found invalid. Canons and methods of statutory construction
thus produced a split in the Supreme Court analogous to that which
occurred in the D.C. Circuit.
In sum, both the majority and the dissent agreed that the Chevron
analysis governed the case, but their respective results bear little resem-
blance to one another. Justice Stevens cited reasons for determining that
the Interior Department's interpretation was "reasonable" based upon the
"text of the Act" and thus implied a decision based on step two of
Chevron."' Interestingly, Stevens, the author of the Chevron decision,
made no reference to its first step-determining whether Congress had
spoken on the matter at issue. Perhaps he considered it a foregone conclu-
sion that Congress had not spoken. Justice Scalia's dissent, on the other
hand, seems to be based on step one of Chevron, finding that Congress
clearly did not intend to delegate the particular power being utilized by the
Secretary; thus, he concluded, while the Court should not substitute its
judgment for that of the agency, it also "may not uphold a regulation by
adding to it even the most reasonable of elements it does not contain."1
To a significant extent, Chevron has fulfilled the prediction made by
Professor Sunstein in a 1986 panel discussion. He said that the decision
"threatens ... to confuse rather than clarify the law governing judicial
deference to statutory interpretation by administrative agencies."11 4 The
state of the law in this area is indeed confused, as the various Sweet Home
opinions illustrate, and it is therefore difficult to predict the amount of
deference that a court will grant an agency's construction of its authorizing
statute. Under the present state of the law, there is the strong possibility,
as Professor Pierce posits, for "cacophony and incoherence throughout the
administrative state."'15
I. Senate Bill 343 on the Chevron Issue
The opinions in Sweet Home illustrate the confused present state of the
Chevron doctrine. One possible solution to most problems of inconsistent
or indeterminate case law is to enact or modify a statute. Indeed, with
regard to the Chevron issue, some scholars have suggested that "as a
threshold matter, reform of substantive review should come in statutory
111. Id. at 2424 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at2412.
113. Id. at 2430 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
114. Sunstein, supra note 13, at 366.
115. Pierce, supra note 61, at 752.
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form, as an amendment to . . . the Administrative Procedure Act. "116
Analyzing the four major versions of Senate Bill 343, the 1995 regulatory
reform statute,117 will help identify the potential problems and benefits
of each version with regard to the judicial review of agency statutory inter-
pretations. Ultimately, this exercise will form the basis of the proposals
for reformation of the Chevron doctrine made at the end of this Note.'
This Part will review the versions in detail, and Table 2 provides an
overview of the similarities and differences among the four versions of
Senate Bill 343 that are pertinent to the Chevron issue:
TABLE 2




(3) Violation for (5)
(1) (2) Must Agency Agency Rule "Supermandate"
Regulatory Requires Addresses Classify To Be To Override
Reform Bill Cost-Benefit Statutory Statutory Arbitrary and Enabling
Version Analysis? Construction? Interpretations? Capricious Statutes?


















Amendment Yes Implicitly Yes chosen agency Unclear




116. Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Judicial Incentives and Indeterminacy in Substantive
Review of Administrative Decisions, 44 DuKE L.J. 1051, 1073 (1995).
117. See supra notes 22-29 and accompanying text.
118. See infra Part IV.
1104
Regulatory Reform 11
The column on cost-benefit analysis shows the greatest commonality
among the four statutes. Although cost-benefit analysis is not the focus of
this Note, it deserves mention here because most of the reform proposals
require that agency statutory interpretations be made in accordance with a
cost-benefit analysis in order to be valid. The second column shows which
versions of Senate Bill 343 address statutory construction by agencies-the
Chevron issue-and whether they do so explicitly or implicitly. The third
column shows which proposals create a new requirement for agencies to
classify conceivable interpretations of an ambiguous enabling statute as
being either "permissible" or "impermissible."119 The column explaining
when a court will find an agency interpretation of its statute to be
"arbitrary and capricious" describes the minimum (but not only) interpre-
tive violation an agency could commit that would force a court to invalidate
an agency's rule. The last column shows which versions of Senate Bill 343
contain a "supermandate" provision whereby any restrictions on statutory
construction in the revised APA would arguably forbid otherwise permis-
sible interpretations by an agency of a statute it administers."2 Each of
these issues will be addressed in more detail in the examination of the four
regulatory reform statutes that follows.
A. The Original Bill: Leveling the Canons of Statutory Construction at
Administrative Agencies
The original version of Senate Bill 343 attempted to deal with the
confusion in Chevron jurisprudence, but ultimately failed because of its
reliance on "traditional principles of statutory construction"121 as a means
of defining the reviewing court's job. Although this version would have
eliminated the reading of Chevron that gives the most deference to
agencies, it retains and even codifies the less deferential version of Chevron
that relies heavily on canons of statutory construction. The lessons to be
learned from this statute are largely negative ones-the problems with
agency statutory construction are not likely to be eliminated simply by
choosing one interpretation of Chevron over another.
119. See infra subpart 1I(B) for a discussion of the adverse implications of requiring an agency
to describe all possible interpretations of a statutory ambiguity in such a manner.
120. It is not always clear whether a particular regulatory reform statute creates a supermandate.
For example, in the case of Amendment 1487, a further revision was offered on the Senate floor to
clarify that the bill did not contain a supermandate. See 141 CONG. REc. S9697 (daily ed. July 11,
1995). However, the initial version of Amendment 1487 discussed in this Note could be interpreted
as providing a supermandate. See id. at S9542 (daily ed. June 30, 1995) (containing a provision that
the rulemaking requirements in a revised APA § 553 apply to "every rulemaking" with only narrow
exceptions). Thus, I have classified Amendment 1487 as "unclear" for its supermandate classification.
One possible reading of the text, described in subpart 11(D), infra, is that there is a supermandate but
that it has prospective application only. As will be shown in Part IV, infra, a supermandate is not
necessarily a disaster for agency rulemaking if its application is narrowly tailored.
121. Id. at S2059 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1995) (quoting § 628 of the introduced version of S. 343).
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For present purposes, the most relevant part of the original version of
Senate Bill 343 was the proposed addition of section 628, a completely new
section, to the APA.12 The latter part of subsection (a), along with sub-
section (b), states the opposite sides of a tautology: an agency, like a court,
must give effect to the clearly expressed intent of Congress by upholding
correct statutory interpretations and rejecting erroneous ones. However,
the fact that both subsections require the court to use "traditional principles
of statutory construction" to determine when Congress "clearly" intends
something seems to be a tip of the hat to Chevron's reference to
"traditional tools of statutory construction."1"
Subsection (c) is the heart of this statute. It sets forth three
requirements for an agency interpretation of its enabling statute to be valid.
First, the agency must have "correctly identified the range" of possible
interpretations; second, the interpretation chosen must be within that range;
and third, the chosen interpretation must, by process of "reasoned
decisionmaking," be the one that "maximizes net benefits" to society."
122. The proposed § 628, in its entirety, reads:
§ 628. Standard for review of agency interpretations of an enabling statute
(a) In reviewing a final agency action under section 706 of this title, or under
a statute that provides for review of a final agency action, the reviewing
court shall affirm the agency's interpretation of the statute granting authority
to promulgate the rule if, applying traditional principles of statutory
construction, the reviewing court finds that the interpretation is clearly the
interpretation of the statute intended by Congress.
(b) If the reviewing court, applying traditional principles of statutory
construction, finds that an interpretation other than the interpretation applied
by the agency is clearly the interpretation of the statute intended by
Congress, the reviewing court shall find that the agency's interpretation is
erroneous and contrary to law.
(c) (1) If the reviewing court, applying established principles of statutory
construction, finds that the statute gives the agency discretion to
choose from among a range of permissible statutory constructions, the
reviewing court shall affirm the agency's interpretation where the
record on review establishes that-
(A) the agency has correctly identified the range of permissible
statutory constructions;
(B) the interpretation chosen is one that is within that range; and
(C) the agency has engaged in reasoned decisionmaking in
determining that the interpretation, rather than other
permissible constructions of the statute, is the one that
maximizes net benefits to society.
(2) If an agency's interpretation of a statute cannot be affirmed under
paragraph (1), the reviewing court shall find that the agency's
interpretation is arbitrary and capricious.
S. 343, 104th Cong. § 628, 141 CONG. REc. 82059 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1995).
123. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9
(1984).
124. S. 343, 104th Cong. § 628(c)(1), 141 CONG. Rnc. S2059 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1995).
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If any of these three requirements are not met, then the interpretation will
be found "arbitrary and capricious. " " Under longstanding case law,
when a court finds an agency's decision-whether the agency made the
decision by rulemaking or adjudication-to be arbitrary and capricious, the
remedy is that the court will remand the agency's wrongly considered
decision back to the agency for proper consideration.
12
The fact that all three requirements must be met raises the possibility
of huge new procedural hurdles for agency decisionmaking without the
benefit of increasing certainty of outcome. Under the present APA and the
Chevron doctrine, an agency must first determine whether an interpretive
ambiguity exists in its statute. Under subsection (c), an agency must do
that and then also proceed to identify "the range of permissible statutory
constructions," presumably by using the same "established principles of
statutory construction" 127 that a reviewing court would subsequently use.
The agency must then conduct a cost-benefit analysis of each competing
construction and choose the one "that maximizes net benefits to society."
Under (c)(1), moreover, evidence that all of these steps have been followed
must appear in "the record" that is before the court. Only then is the court
allowed by this provision to affirm the agency's interpretation of its statute.
In effect, this version of Senate Bill 343 ratifies the existing uncertainty in
the Stevens reading of Chevron that relies upon canons of statutory con-
struction by making them the first and foremost method to discern "clear"
congressional intent. It also duplicates the uncertainty by requiring the
agency to engage in a similarly expansive and uncertain analysis.
The message to agencies under this statute is clear-hire more
administrative lawyers and stock up on paper. In the long-established rule
of administrative law set forth in SEC v. Chenery Corp., an agency
may not rely upon post-hoc rationalizations for an action that is challenged
125. Id. § 628(c)(2), 141 CONG. REc. S2059 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1995).
126. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 46
(1983) (holding that a decision by the Department of Transportation to rescind a rule requiring passive
restraints in automobiles was arbitrary and capricious, and that "further consideration of the issue by
the agency is therefore required"); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,
419-20 (1971) (declaring that if the district court finds the decision to locate a federally funded highway
was arbitrary and capricious, then the district court can remand the decision to the Department of
Transportation).
127. The reference to "traditional principles of statutory construction" in subsections (a) and (b)
and the reference to "established principles of statutory construction' in subsection (c)(1) are eerily
similar to the Supreme Court's endorsement of "traditional tools of statutory construction" in the
infamous footnote nine of Chevron. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9. The multiplicity of opinions in
the Sweet Home litigation, discussed in subpart 11(B), supra, shows the uncertainty inherent in such
an approach.
128. 318 U.S. 80, 95 (1943).
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in court.129 Rather, under Chenery, the rationale for a final action must
exist somewhere in the agency's prelitigation files." The original
version of Senate Bill 343 does not appear to modify or abrogate the
Chenery rule, yet it adds significant new requirements for an agency to
document its legal rationale. Not only must an agency identify a permis-
sible statutory construction to justify its action 3' (as it must do now), but
it must also identify all of the other permissible interpretations that it did
not use."' Section 628 also makes reference in subsection 628(c)(1)(C)
to cost-benefit analysis and requires that the record contain evidence that
"the agency has engaged in reasoned decisionmaking" in picking an
interpretation that arguably "maximizes net benefits to society."133
Creating a comprehensive list of permissible constructions for every agency
action built upon a statutory ambiguity would surely require a massive
number of lawyer hours at the agency as well as proof on paper of what
those hours produced. The debate over the use of cost-benefit analysis in
the regulatory process is beyond the scope of this Note. It is safe to say
in this context, however, that it would put yet additional strains on agency
resources. The main source of interpretive difficulties in this original
version of Senate Bill 343 is nonetheless its endorsement of "established
principles of statutory construction" for the reviewing courts." 4
The widely differing opinions in Sweet Home, for example, would
remain largely untouched by the original bill, and that is precisely its
problem. Although this version of Senate Bill 343 does address the
Chevron issue as a noteworthy part of regulatory reform, its biggest down-
fall is that it codifies a terribly indeterminate scope of review grounded in
the all-too-malleable canons of statutory construction.
129. Id. at 95.
130. See id. at 87 ("The grounds upon which an administrative order must be judged are those
upon which the record discloses that its action was based.").
131. See S. 343, 104th Cong. § 628(c)(1)(B), 141 CONG. REc. S2059 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1995).
132. See id. § 628(c)(1)(A), 141 CONG. REC. S2059 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1995).
133. See id. § 628(c)(I)(B)-(C), 141 CONG. REc. S2059 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1995).
134. This version of Senate Bill 343 shares a characteristic with the Judiciary Committee's version
of the bill, a characteristic that is especially problematic in the latter version: the possibility of an
agency misclassifying as permissible or impermissible a statutory interpretation that is neither required
nor actually used. In other words, an agency might choose a permissible interpretation of its statute,
yet incorrectly classify an unused interpretation and on that basis alone have its rule remanded. See
infra subpart re(B). That problem is not dealt with here because I believe that it is overshadowed in
the original version of S. 343 by that bill's endorsement of established principles of statutory construc-
tion. The Judiciary Committee bill contains no similar endorsement, so more emphasis is given to the
misclassification problem with that version.
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B. The Judiciary Committee: Statutory Interpretation as Apples and
Oranges
Like the original bill, the Judiciary Committee's version of Senate
Bill 343135 recognized the problem of conflicting interpretations of the
Chevron doctrine and sought to avoid "blank check" deference to govern-
ment agency interpretations of law.136 Unlike the original bill, however,
it had the virtue of not directing agency and court attention to canons of
statutory construction. Rather, agencies were directed to engage in a
particularized process of statutory interpretation that was geared toward
labeling all conceivable interpretations as permissible or impermissible
under the agency statute. 37 Although this Note will later recommend
that agency statutory interpretations be channelled into a special process as
is done in this version of the bill, 3 ' the particular process used here does
more harm than good for at least two reasons. First, the statutory interpre-
tation and review process is unnecessarily intertwined with the cost-benefit
analysis provisions of the bill. Second, the requirement that agencies
identify and then classify all possible interpretations as permissible or
impermissible is a waste of intellectual resources that channels effort into
an exercise developing policies that may not have even the slightest constit-
uency supporting them.139
Given the Judiciary Committee's subject-matter expertise, it is not
surprising that the committee focused a substantial portion of its report on
judicial review."4  The committee endorsed the "landmark" Chevron
decision as the appropriate standard for how courts should review agency
interpretations of their enabling statutes, but expressed a concern about
some interpretations of the doctrine. 4' The committee particularly
derided deference advocates who, in the report's words, saw Chevron "as
if it were a blank check for an agency to adopt any interpretation that it
135. The Comprehensive Regulatory Reform Act of 1995 was referred to the Senate Judiciary
Committee on February 2, 1995. See 141 CONG. REc. S2068 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1995). After hearings
and testimony before both the Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight and the full committee, the
bill was reported favorably to the full Senate on April 26, 1995. See S. REP. No. 104-90, at 35-37
(1995) (describing the legislative history of S. 343 in the Senate Judiciary Committee).
136. S. REP. No. 104-90, at 107.
137. See S. 343, 104th Cong. § 706(c)(2)(A)(i), S. REP. No. 104-90, at 22 (1995) (instructing
courts to hold arbitrary and capricious an agency action in which the agency "improperly classified"
any interpretation as being permissible or impermissible).
138. See fifra Part IV.
139. See infra subpart IV(B) (discussing the value of requiring a minimal constituency as a
threshold for when to mandate agency consideration of a plausible statutory interpretation).
140. See S. REP. No. 104-90, at 101-12.
141. See id. at 106-09.
1997] 1109
Texas Law Review [Vol. 75:1085
sees fit." 42 Such an interpretation, it said, "ignores the principle, laid
down in Marbury v. Madison, and applied in later cases over almost two
centuries, that the judiciary has the ultimate authority to interpret whether
the actions of the executive branch are in accord with the law."143
Instead, the proper role of the judiciary is to examine the "reasonableness"
of an agency's statutory interpretation as a matter of policy.1"
The committee thought that the facts of the Chevron case itself were
an ideal example of a situation that calls for judicial deference. The issue
in Chevron was the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) interpreta-
tion of the term "stationary source" as used in the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1977.145 The EPA adopted a "bubble" definition under
which all pollution-emitting devices would be grouped together for initial
permitting and permit-modification purposes, while an environmental group
claimed that the statute required the EPA to adhere to its prior definition
of "stationary source" under which any increase in emissions by a
particular device, even if offset by a reduction elsewhere in the plant,
would require a permit or a modification.1" The Court held that the
EPA's second definition was entitled to substantial deference. 4 7 After
142. Id. at 107. The Judiciary Committee drove home its disapproval of the strongly deferential
reading of Chevron by critiquing a passage out of one of the most prominent administrative law
treatises:
An example of what, in the committee's view, is a misreading of the Chevron doctrine
is the second sentence in the following passage: "Under Chevron, an agency's
construction of a statutory provision it is responsible to implement is binding on a court
if it is a 'permissible construction of the statute.' It is a 'permissible construction' unless
Congress has 'unambiguously' addressed the 'precise question' in a manner inconsistent
with the agency's construction."
Id. at 108 (quoting 1 DAvIS & PiRscE, supra note 60, § 6.3, at 235 (3d ed. 1994) (quoting Chevron
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984))). If the committee
report is to be taken seriously as an interpretive guide, then this version of S. 343 would abrogate one
of the most popular readings of Chevron.
143. Id. at 107.
144. Id. As the Judiciary Committee explained:
The court must determine in all cases whether the agency's interpretation is permissible
within the bounds of the discretion that Congress has delegated to the agency in the
statute. Even where Congress has not directly spoken to the issue, certain agency
interpretations may not, in the reviewing court's construction of the parameters of the
statute, be a "reasonable policy choice for the agency to make." Chevron, 467 U.S. at
845. This "reasonableness" test reflects a proper degree of judicial deference to the
agency to which Congress has delegated authority, but it is not absolute deference because
it is grounded in a statute; it is not an abdication of the judiciary's responsibility under
the Constitution to interpret the laws that Congress makes.
Id.
145. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 839-40
(1984) (reviewing the EPA interpretation of "statutory source" as used in the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 129, 91 Stat. 685, 747 (1977)).
146. Id. at 857-59.
147. Id. at 866.
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agreeing with the Supreme Court's "step-one" analysis that Congress had
not directly addressed the issue,1" the Judiciary Committee described the
"step-two" test as hinging on the process that the agency used to reach its
policy decision:
The basis of the Court's decision in the second step was its
independent "examination of the legislation and its history." Only
after conducting that examination, and reviewing the agency's
explanation for its choice and its rejection of alternative
interpretations, did the Court conclude that the Administrator's
actions represented "a reasonable policy choice for the agency to
make."
149
Thus, the committee believed that the agency should have a specific
burden for placing materials in its records that deal with statutory interpre-
tation, and must then explain how it used them. If the reviewing court, on
the basis of the agency paper trail, cannot find that an agency's decision
was a reasonable accommodation of the congressional policy goals mani-
fested by the enabling statute, then that decision is not entitled to Chevron
deference. Indeed, the decision is "arbitrary and capricious" as a matter
of law, and the remedy for arbitrary and capricious agency action is a
remand to the agency for further consideration.1"
The most relevant and significant parts of the Judiciary Committee's
version of Senate Bill 343 are its amendments to sections 55351 and
148. In the Judiciary Committee's words,
After determining that Congress had not "directly spoken to the precise question at issue,"
[Chevron, 467 U.S.] at 842, the Court concluded that "the Administrator's interpretation
represents a reasonable accommodation of manifestly competing interests" since "the
regulatory scheme is technical and complex, the agency considered the matter in a
detailed and reasonedfashion, and the decision involves reconciling conflicting policies."
Id. at 865 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added by the committee).
S. REP. No. 104-90, at 107-08 (1995).
149. Id. at 108 (emphasis in original) (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845).
150. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
151. The relevant parts of § 553, as amended by this version, read as follows:
§ 553. Rulemaking
(C) ....
(4) An agency shall publish any final rule it adopts in the Federal
Register, together with a concise statement of the basis and purpose
of the rule and a statement of when the rule may become effective.
The statement of basis and purpose shall include-
(C) (i) an explanation of whether the specific statutory
interpretation upon which the rule is based is expressly
required by the text of the statute; or
(ii) if the specific statutory interpretation upon which the
rule is based is not expressly required by the text of the
statute, an explanation that the interpretation is within
the range of permissible interpretations of the statute as
Texas Law Review [Vol. 75:1085
706152 of the APA. Section 553(c)(4) contemplates that an agency will
conduct a statutory-construction analysis of all of the possible
interpretations of the statute upon which an agency is basing its rule.
Under section 553(c)(4)(C), the agency is required' to conduct its own
Chevron step one to determine whether Congress "expressly required" the
interpretation given by the agency. If Congress was less than clear on the
matter, the agency must explain how its interpretation falls within the range
of permissible constructions of the statute. Moreover, the agency must
justify its rejection of other possible statutory constructions, or at least the
ones "proposed in comments to the agency." Notably, all of these findings
are to be published in the Federal Register. Although this would add
substantial bulk to that publication by expanding the already lengthy
preambles that agencies now publish along with their proposed and final
rules," it would have the benefit of putting the agency's interpretive
rationale in a widely distributed, easily accessible publication for all to see.
identified by the agency, and why the agency has
rejected other interpretations proposed in comments to
the agency ....
S. 343, 104th Cong. § 553, S. REP. No. 104-90, at 2-3 (1995).
152. The relevant portions of § 706, as amended by this version, read as follows:
§ 706. Scope of Review
(c) In reviewing an agency interpretation of a statute governing the authority for
an agency action, including agency action taken pursuant to a statute that
provides for review of final agency action, the reviewing court shall-
(1) hold erroneous and unlawful-
(A) an agency interpretation that is other than the interpretation of
the statute clearly intended by Congress; or
(B) an agency interpretation that is outside the range of permissible
interpretations of the statute; and
(2) hold arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion-
(A) an agency action as to which the agency-
(i) has improperly classified an interpretation as being
within or outside the range of permissible
interpretations; or
(ii) has not explained in a reasoned analysis why it selected
the interpretation and why it rejected other permissible
interpretations of the statute; or
(B) in the case of agency action subject to chapter 6, an
interpretation that does not give the agency the broadest
discretion to develop rules that will satisfy the [cost-benefit
analysis] decisional criteria of section 624.
(d) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the provisions of this subsection
shall apply to, and supplement, the requirements contained in any statute for
the review of final agency action which is not otherwise subject to this
subsection.
Id. § 706, S. REP. No. 104-90, at 21-22 (1995).
153. See, e.g., Land Disposal Restrictions, 61 Fed. Reg. 2337, 2337-75 (1996) (proposing
amendments to the Environmental Protection Agency's hazardous waste land disposal restrictions). The
preamble explaining the basis and purpose of the rule filled 33 pages while the text of the rule itself
filled only 5 pages.
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The proposed section 706(c)(1)(A) is analogous to step one of Chevron
in that it requires the reviewing court to invalidate a statutory interpretation
"that is other than the interpretation of the statute clearly intended by
Congress." Section 706(c)(1)(B) parallels step two of Chevron by
invalidating a construction "that is outside the range of permissible
interpretations of the statute." The main virtue of these subsections over
the current Chevron doctrine is that they do not require or endorse
"traditional tools of statutory construction. " 15 The most noteworthy
problem with this version is section 706(c)(2). After an agency has
developed a comprehensive list of possible interpretations (as is required
under both this version of the bill and the original version), it must then go
a step further than the original bill required and label each statutory
interpretation as either "permissible" or "impermissible," subject to an
"arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion" review standard.15 As
mentioned previously, the finding by a court that an agency action is
arbitrary and capricious requires that the agency's action, whether the
result of rulemaking or adjudication, be remanded to the agency for
"better" reasoning than the agency conducted the first time around. 56
Section 706(c)(2)(A) would require a remand if "the agency has improperly
classified an interpretation as being within or outside the range of
permissible interpretations," and it makes no difference whether the agency
actually used the misclassified interpretation.157 Thus, if an agency
mistakenly classifies as "permissible" a particular interpretation that is
actually "impermissible," but adopts a different, yet permissible interpre-
tation in its rulemaking, any agency action based on the unquestionably
permissible interpretation actually used by the agency must be found
arbitrary and capricious and subject to remand. The "arbitrary and
capricious" penalty would apply regardless of whether the interpretation
actually used by the agency was valid in and of itself.
The members of the Judiciary Committee voting in the minority were
highly critical of these provisions in the bill, voicing concern about "the
undefined scope of policymaking authority we will blindly cede to the
Federal courts .... "1 They claimed that the bill would "actually
require judges to be the 'judicial activists' many of the proponents ...
have decried over the years"159 and cited a comment from Professor
Sunstein's testimony before the committee asserting that Senate Bill 343
154. See supra notes 52-59 and accompanying text.
155. S. 343, 104th Cong. § 706(c)(2), S. REP. No. 104-90, at 22 (1995).
156. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
157. See S. 343, 104th Cong. § 706(c)(2)(A), S. REP. No. 104-90, at 22 (1995).




was a "Full Employment Act for both Lawyers and Accountants. ""'0
Perhaps trying to drive home their point by sheer quantity, the committee
Democrats also attached an appendix entitled "120 Items to Litigate Under
S. 343."'1' Included among the 120 items were two questions squarely
related to "the Chevron problem" of agency statutory interpretation, and
they are illustrative of the new directions that Chevron litigation might
move toward under this version of Senate Bill 343:
57. If statute ambiguous, did agency correctly identify range of
permissible statutory constructions?
58. Is agency interpretation of statute within permissible range? 62
Both of these questions, though awkwardly phrased, nonetheless go directly
to the problem of agency interpretive classification errors.
The scope of review provisions in the Judiciary Committee's bill do
not present a practical solution to the Chevron problem. Instructing
agencies to classify all conceivable statutory interpretations as permissible
or impermissible without regard to the fact that some interpretations may
have no constituency is a waste of agency resources, and allowing post-hoe
challenges to otherwise valid rules on the basis of minor interpretive
misclassifications is an equal waste of judicial resources. Intertwining
Chevron review with cost-benefit analysis unnecessarily complicates an
already difficult problem with additional controversy."6 Nonetheless,
this bill contains useful concepts that will resurface later. Specifically, the
ideas of a special agency process for statutory interpretation's and a
legislatively defined active role for the reviewing courts reappear in
more refined forms in the proposals at the end of this Note.
C. The Governmental Affairs Committee: Driving Past the Chevron
Station16
Unlike the other three major versions of Senate Bill 343, the substitute
bill offered by the Governmental Affairs Committee made no reference at
160. Id. at 157 (quoting Professor Cass Sunstein).
161. Id. at 159.
162. Id. at 160.
163. The relative merits and detriments of cost-benefit analysis are beyond the scope of this Note.
For a summary of proposals in which cost-benefit analysis came up in the 104th Congress, see Robert
M. Simon, Issues in Risk Assessment and Cost-Benefit Analysis and their Relationship to Regulatory
Reform, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 1611 (1995).
164. See infra subpart IV(A).
165. See infra subpart IV(D).
166. As best as I have been able to determine, this pun was first used in Peter H. Schuck & E.




all to the Chevron problem and would thus presumably keep the muddled
case law intact.167 However, even this Chevron-less form of regulatory
reform contains some key lessons for improving the scope of judicial
review for agency-interpreted statutes. The lessons come primarily from
a provision that expressly limits the applicability of the APA
amendments.168
This version adds other new provisions of the APA that, at first, could
seem to inject a new variable into step one of the Chevron analysis. Like
the original and Judiciary Committee versions of Senate Bill 343, the
Governmental Affairs bill elevates cost-benefit analysis to a higher level of
concern in the rulemaking process.1" If enacted, these provisions could
imply that the "unambiguously expressed intent of Congress""7 compo-
nent of the first step of Chevron for most agency-administered statutes
should be construed as including cost-benefit analysis. Such a legislatively
endorsed canon of construction, if true, would have a tremendous effect on
Chevron deference, as it would open the door for courts to eviscerate the
second, deferential step of Chevron. Any rule that did not satisfy the
reviewing court as properly weighing costs and benefits would be deemed
contrary to congressional intent and remanded to the agency. Ultimately,
however, that reading of the cost-benefit provisions would fail because this
version of the bill contains specific limiting language that prevents its cost-
benefit requirements from overriding the specific provisions of an enabling
statute. Both the cost-benefit analysis provisions and the important limiting
language are in the proposed section 622.171
167. The version of Senate Bill 343 produced by the Governmental Affairs Committee received,
at least initially, the benefit of broad bipartisan support. See S. REP. NO. 104-89, at 10 (1995). This
version actually substituted the entire text of Senate Bill 291, a regulatory reform bill introduced by
committee chair Senator William Roth, in place of the original draft of Senate Bill 343 that was referred
from the Senate floor. Id. The net result of this maneuver was that the committee reported favorably
upon the text of Roth's bill twice. Id.
168. See S. 343, 104th Cong. § 622(h), S. REP. No. 104-89, at 78 (1995).
169. See id. §§ 621-626, S. REP. NO. 104-89, at 73-82 (1995).
170. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
171. The relevant portions of § 622, a new section proposed by this version, read as follows:
9 622. Rulemaking cost-benefit analysis
(d) (1) When the agency publishes a final major rule, the agency shall also
issue and place in the rulemaking file a final cost-benefit analysis, and
shall include a summary of the analysis in the statement of basis and
purpose.
(2) Each final cost-benefit analysis shall contain-
(B) if not expressly or implicitly inconsistent with the statute under
which the agency is acting, a reasonable determination, based
upon the rulemaking file considered as a whole, whether-
(i) the benefits of the rule justify the costs of the rule; and
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Section 622(h) is the most concise statement of this rule of non-
displacement, but other provisions demonstrate that it is a thread running
throughout the text of the bill."n In a single stroke, it prevents cost-
benefit analysis from becoming a supermandate that overlays every organic
statute. The initially apparently restrictive power of section 622(d) would
thus be to no avail in many specific statutory schemes."
Therefore, although the Governmental Affairs Committee bill does
not address the Chevron issue, it nevertheless contains a valuable reminder
that any type of regulatory reform, whether involving agency statutory
interpretations or not, should be limited in scope. Careful limitation of the
applicability of otherwise sweeping legislation will increase its
functionality-not to mention its chances of political survival.174  This
Note later argues that judicial review of agency statutory interpretations
should have an explicitly defined scope 5 and that any reform of the
Chevron doctrine should have prospective applicability only.17 The
model for these limitations is the clear nondisplacement provision in this
version of Senate Bill 343 that prevents it from being a supermandate.
D. Amendment 1487: Using a Defined Record
Generally, Amendment 1487 omits the stringent interpretive classifica-
tions that the Judiciary Committee version includes, but it does not ignore
the Chevron problem as the Governmental Affairs Committee did. 77 For
(ii) the rule will achieve the rulemaking objectives in a more
cost-effective manner than the alternatives described in
the rulemaking ....
(h) The requirements of this subchapter shall not alter the criteria for rulemaking
otherwise applicable under other statutes.
S. 343, 104th Cong. § 622, S. REP. No. 104-89, at 75-78 (1995).
172. See, e.g., id. § 622(d)(2)(B), S. REP. No. 104-89, at 77 (1995) (requiring cost-benefit
analysis only "if not expressly or implicitly inconsistent with the statute under which the agency is
acting"); see also S. REP. No. 104-89, at 69 (statement by Democratic members of the committee)
("The bill is fair because, while requiring agency analysis and certification of whether the benefits of
the rule justify the costs, it does not override the statutory scheme upon which the rule is based.").
173. One of the most notable unaffected statutes would be the Endangered Species Act, because
the Supreme Court has already determined that it actually prohibits the use of cost-benefit analysis in
the agency decisionmaking process. See TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 183-88 (1978) ("The plain intent
of Congress in enacting this statute was to halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction,
whatever the cost.").
174. Compare S. REP. No. 104-89, at 1 (describing the unanimous bipartisan support of the
Governmental Affairs Committee members for its version of S. 343), with 141 CONG. REC. S10,400
(daily ed. July 20, 1995) (statement by Sen. Dole) (conceding that the final version of S. 343 fell 2
votes short of the 60 needed for cloture).
175. See infra subpart IV(B).
176. See infra subpart IV(E).
177. The version of Senate Bill 343 most debated on the Senate floor was Amendment 1487. It
was, with a few modifications, the version of the bill being considered when the vote to close debate
fell two votes short on July 20, 1995. See 141 CONG. REC. S10,399-400 (daily ed. July 20, 1995).
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present purposes, the most notable features of this version of the bill are
(1) its creation of special parts of the rulemaking record that deal with
statutory interpretation, and (2) its placement on the general public of the
responsibility for suggesting statutory interpretations in opposition to the
one suggested by the agency in its proposed rule. Both of these concepts
return in the reform proposed at the end of this Note.178
As it relates to the Chevron doctrine, the most relevant parts of
Amendment 1487 are its changes to sections 553 and 706 of the APA. The
rulemaking record provisions in the proposed section 553"9 reflect a
The vote of 58 yeas and 40 nays fell 2 votes short of the 60 needed to close debate. See id. The vote
fell almost entirely along party lines, with Republicans supporting the measure 54-0, and Democrats
opposing it 4-40. See id. In addition to considering the Judiciary and Governmental Affairs
Committee proposals, this amendment had significant input from Senator J. Bennett Johnston, a
Louisiana Democrat. See id. at S10,400 (statement by Sen. Dole) (singling out Senator Johnston for
his "tireless efforts" in creating a more broadly acceptable bill). In his postmortem on the failed
cloture vote, Johnston gave much credit to the Administrative Law Committee of the American Bar
Association for the final version of Senate Bill 343. See id. at S10,505 (daily ed. July 21, 1995).
Given this input, Amendment 1487 may also be the version of the bill that best represented the ideas
of the administrative law bar.
178. See infra subparts IV(A-B).
179. The relevant portions of § 553, as amended by this version of S. 343, are as follows:
§ 553. Rulemaking
(b) NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKIN.-General notice of proposed
rulemaking shall be published in the Federal Register, unless all persons
subject thereto are named and either personally served or otherwise have
actual notice of the proposed rulemaking in accordance with law. Each
notice of proposed rulemaking shall include-
(3) a succinct explanation of the specific statutory basis for the proposed
rule, including an explanation of-
(A) whether the interpretation is clearly required by the text of the
statute; or
(B) if the interpretation is not clearly required by the text of the
statute, an explanation that the interpretation is within the range
of permissible interpretations of the statute as identified by the
agency, and an explanation why the interpretation selected by
the agency is the agency's preferred interpretation;
(g) STATEMENT OF BASIS AND PURPOSE.-An agency shall publish each final
rule it adopts in the Federal Register, together with a concise statement of
the basis and purpose of the rule and a statement of when the rule may
become effective. The statement of basis and purpose shall include-
(3) a succinct explanation of whether the specific statutory basis for the
rule is expressly required by the text of the statute, or if the specific
statutory interpretation upon which the rule is based is not expressly
required by the text of the statute, an explanation that the
interpretation is within the range of permissible interpretations of the
statute as identified by the agency, and why the agency has rejected
other interpretations proposed in comments to the agency;
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substantial change from current law. Section 553(b) of this proposal
requires an agency to publish a "notice of proposed rulemaking" in the
Federal Register." While this is a common practice in current notice
and comment rulemaking, this statute also introduces the step-one Chevron
concept into section 553(b)(3)(A) by requiring publication of an agency
determination of "whether the interpretation is clearly required by the text
of the [agency-administered] statute. "181 An extended step two of
Chevron is created by the requirement in section 553(b)(3)(B) that an
agency determine whether its chosen interpretation "is within the range of
permissible interpretations of the statute as identified by the agency, and
an explanation why the interpretation selected by the agency is the agency's
preferred interpretation."" z This language calls to mind the classification
scheme of the Judiciary Committee, but there is a substantial difference.
While this text seems to presume the development of an agency list of
permissible and impermissible interpretations, the agency need only publish
(j) RULEMAKGNo FiL.-
(1) The agency shall maintain a file for each rulemaking proceeding
conducted pursuant to this section and shall maintain a current index
to such file.
(2) Except as provided in subsection (k), the file shall be made available
to the public not later than the date on which the agency makes an
initial publication concerning the rule.
(3) The rulemaking file shall include-
(A) the notice of proposed rulemaking, any supplement to, or
modification or revision of, such notice, and any advance
notice of proposed rulemaking;
(B) copies of all written comments received on the proposed rule;
(C) a transcript, summary, or other record of any public hearing
conducted on the rulemaking;
(D) copies, or an identification of the place at which copies may be
obtained, of factual and methodological material that pertains
directly to the rulemaking and that was considered by the
agency in connection with the rulemaking, or that was
submitted to or prepared by or for the agency in connection
with the rulemaking; and
(E) any statement, description, analysis, or other material that the
agency is required to prepare or issue in connection with the
rulemaking, including any analysis prepared or issued pursuant
to chapter 6 [provisions relating to cost-benefit analysis, risk
assessment, and statutorily authorized executive oversight of
agency actions].
The agency shall place each of the foregoing materials in the file as
soon as practicable after each such material becomes available to the
agency.
S. 343, 104th Cong. § 553, 141 CONG. REc. S9542-43 (daily ed. June 30, 1995).
180. Id. § 553(b), 141 CONG. RFc. S9542 (daily ed. June 30, 1995).
181. Id. § 553(b)(3)(A), 141 CONG. REc. S9542 (daily ed. June 30, 1995).
182. Id. § 553(b)(3)(B), 141 CONG. R.c. S9542 (daily ed. June 30, 1995).
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a finding at the initial rulemaking stage that its own interpretation is
permissible.
Subsection (g) of section 553 defines another Federal Register
document for the rulemaking agency to produce and publish: "a concise
statement of the basis and purpose" of the final rule.1" Like subsection
(b) does for proposed rules, this subsection incorporates Chevron analysis
into the promulgation of final rules. The step-one finding of whether a
certain statutory interpretation is "expressly required" is the same as for
proposed rules. The take on step two of Chevron is quite different: if the
agency finds that a particular interpretation is not expressly required, then
it must develop and publish "an explanation that the interpretation is within
the range of permissible interpretations of the statute as identified by the
agency, and why the agency has rejected other interpretations proposed in
comments to the agency."'" The fact that the agency need only respond
to statutory interpretations suggested by commenters prior to the final
rulemaking has the effect of shifting the true burden of developing the list
of permissible constructions from the agency to those persons who would
later challenge the agency's proposed rule. Unlike the Judiciary
Committee version, Amendment 1487 does not impose upon the agency the
onerous and unnecessary task of developing, classifying, and explaining
away every possible statutory interpretation where ambiguity exists."'
Subsection 553(j), defining the parameters of an agency file for each
rulemaking proceeding, is what makes the subsequent judicial review of
statutory interpretations possible, as a practical matter. 86 Subsection (j)(3)
requires inclusion of the notice of proposed rulemaking, copies of all
written comments (thus including suggested statutory interpretations), and
"any statement, description, analysis, or other material that the agency is
required to prepare or issue in connection with the rulemaking."1 ' This
record is the real key to the judicial review provisions of Amendment 1487
because it defines precisely what a reviewing court may look at when a
rulemaking is challenged. Table 3 summarizes the most important
components of the rulemaking record.
183. Id. § 553(g), 141 CONG. REc. S9542 (daily ed. June 30, 1995).
184. Id. § 553(g)(3), 141 CONG. RFC. S9542 (daily ed. June 30, 1995) (emphasis added).
185. The Judiciary Committee proposal also contains language requiring response to the specific
comments proposed to the agency. See S. 343, 104th Cong. § 553(c)(4)(C), S. REP. No. 104-90, at
3 (1995). However, my discussion of the Judiciary Committee bill focuses on its requirement that the
agency classify all potential statutory interpretations as permissible or impermissible. See supra subpart
11(B).
186. See S. 343, 104th Cong. § 553(j), 141 CONa. Rsc. S9543 (daily ed. June 30, 1995).




The Rulemaking Record Under Amendment 1487
Published in
Federal
Statutory Authority Register? Contents of the Record
§ 553(b) Yes "Notice of proposed rulemaking" with explanation of the
agency's interpretation as either required or permissible.
§ 553(g) Yes "Concise statement of basis and purpose" of the final rule,
explaining why the agency has rejected other interpretations
proposed in comments to the agency.
§ 553(j)(3)(B) No Copies of all written comments.
§ 553(j)(3)(C) No Transcript, summary, or other record of public hearing on
the rulemaking.
§ 553(j)(3)(D) No Factual or methodological materials relied upon in creating
the rule, or where to locate such materials.
§ 5530)(3)(E) No Materials prepared by the agency for cost-benefit analysis,
risk assessment, and statutorily authorized executive
oversight.
Section 7061" brings this new rulemaking record into the inter-
pretive process as a more concrete source for determining "relevant
questions of law." 89 This provision would allow a reviewing court to
188. The relevant portions of § 706, as amendedby this versionof Senate Bill 343, areas follows:
§ 706. Scope of Review
(a) To the extent necessary to reach a decision and when presented, the
reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret
constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or
applicability of the terms of an agency action. The reviewing court shall-
(1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed;
and
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions
found to be-
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not
in accordance with law;
(D) without observance of procedure required by law;
(F) without substantial support in the rulemaking file, viewed as a
whole, for the asserted or necessary factual basis, in the case
of a rule adopted in a proceeding subject to section 553;
(b) In making the determinations set forth in subsection (a), the court shall
review the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party, and due
account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error.
Id. § 706, 141 CONG. REC. S9550 (daily ed. June 30, 1995).
189. Id. § 706(a), 141 CONG. REC. S9542 (daily ed. June 30, 1995).
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set aside agency actions found to be "without substantial support in the
rulemaking file, viewed as a whole, for the asserted or necessary factual
basis, in the case of a rule adopted in a proceeding subject to section
553. "190 By this single stroke, section 706 judicial review expressly
includes every item in the agency's mandated rulemaking file, including the
explanations of statutory interpretation developed by the agency at the pro-
posed and final rulemaking stages. Thus, Amendment 1487 has two steps
of statutory analysis that stand in for a Chevron review of agency
rulemakings:
(1) At the proposed rule stage, the agency must determine
whether a specific interpretation of its enabling statute is
required (§ 553(b)(3)(A)). If it is not, then the agency must
develop an interpretation within the range of permissive
interpretations and explain why that is its preferred choice
(§ 553(b)(3)(B)); and
(2) At the final rule stage, if the statute was found to be ambig-
uous under step (1), then the agency must explain why its
chosen statutory interpretation is preferable to other inter-
pretations suggested by written comment (§ 553(g)(3)).
If a final rule is litigated, then the court would review the agency's statu-
tory interpretation at steps (1) and (2) as published in the Federal Register
in order to determine if the interpretation fits the asserted or necessary
factual basis claimed by the agency under section 706(a)(2)(F). 19 The
record before the court would contain the agency's justification of its statu-
tory interpretation for its final rule and explanations of why its interpreta-
tion of the statute is better than those suggested in written comments. This
last determination would be on the basis of provisions set out elsewhere in
the bill, including cost-benefit analysis and risk assessment. Keep in mind,
however, that a future regulatory reform bill dealing with the Chevron
issue in a manner such as this would not necessarily need to have cost-
benefit analysis and risk assessment as its determinative criteria. Reform
of the Chevron doctrine need not be tied together with cost-benefit analysis.
The proposed section 625 contains language that could allow a
separate process for dealing with rules that predate regulatory reform." z
190. Id. § 706 (a)(2)(F), 141 CONG. REc. S9550 (daily ed. June 30, 1995) (emphasis added).
191. See id., 141 CONG. REc. S9550 (daily ed. June 30, 1995).
192. Subsection (d) of § 625 contains the following relevant language:
§ 625. Jurisdiction and judicial review
(d) STANDARDS FOR REviE.-In any proceeding involving judicial review
under section 706 or under the statute granting the rulemaking authority,
failure to comply with [the cost-benefit, risk analysis, and related statutory
interpretation provisions] may be considered by the court solely for the
purpose of determining whether the final agency action is arbitrary and
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The question of whether an agency's statutory interpretation by rulemaking
is valid under the new cost-benefit analysis scheme is subject to "judicial
review under section 706 or under the statute granting the rulemaking
authority.""'r The emphasized language in section 625 can be read to
incorporate the "old" (present) APA and the specific agency's enabling
statute as the basis for reviewing the existing and unamended
regulations.1" In other words, judicial review of the rule is to be under
the statutes, including the APA, that granted the rulemaking authority at
the time the rule was promulgated. The effect of this subsection is to limit
the application of the new section 706-which requires a court to analyze
the newly required rulemaking record developed under the new section
553-to only those regulations that have been promulgated or amended
since the enactment of the regulatory reform bill.195 Is this a strained
reading of the statute? Probably. But the consequences of a court finding
that the new provisions have retroactive application would be dire. The
status of so many regulations could be called into question that the work
of many agencies would grind to a halt. In such a situation, a court would
probably latch onto any reasonable means of limiting the effect of the new
APA to subsequent regulations.
Amendment 1487 faces the Chevron problem, but in a much more
subtle way than any of its predecessors. It contains two interesting pro-
posals for decreasing the uncertainty surrounding agency statutory interpre-
tations. First, it creates a section in the rulemaking record that is expressly
devoted to statutory interpretation. Second, it delegates responsibility to
capricious or an abuse of discretion (or unsupported by substantial evidence
where that standard is otherwise provided by law).
Id. § 625(d), 141 CONG. REC. S9546 (daily ed. June 30, 1995).
193. Id., 141 CONG. REc. S9546 (daily ed. June 30, 1995) (emphasis added).
194. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1994). The present section 553 is a generally applicable statute
authorizing and defining the scope of agency rulemaking. Most of its procedural requirements,
however, are not found directly in its text, but-in an extensive case law overlay. See generally
STEPHEN G. BREYER & RIcHARD B. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY PoLIcY 572-
73 (3d ed. 1992) (describing the judiciary's development of § 553 into an elaborate "paper hearing"
process, requiring the agency to justify the rule with extensive documentation that will serve as a basis
for judicial review).
195. While I believe that this interpretation of the proposed § 625(d) is correct, I concede that it
is far from self-evident. Section 625(a) states that its judicial review provisions relate only to agency
compliance with "this subchapter and subchapter 1U"-the cost-benefit analysis and risk assessment
provisions. S. 343, 104th Cong. § 625(a), 141 CONG. REc. S9546 (daily ed. June 30, 1995). At first
glance this would seem to exclude consideration of the § 553 rulemaking record which is in an entirely
different chapter. In this version of the bill, however, the most significant challenges to statutory
interpretations under a revised APA would involve whether the agency conducted proper cost-benefit
analysis in interpreting its statute. In such an instance both § 553 and § 625 would be applicable. It
is unfortunate that prospective applicability arises from such a roundabout reading of the proposed
statute. A future proposal to reform the Chevron doctrine ought to make its prospective applicability
explicit, and that prospective applicability should be independent of cost-benefit analysis provisions (if
any) in the legislation.
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the interested public for proposing alternatives to the agency's proposal.
The most unfortunate fault in this bill is that it leaves unanswered many
questions regarding the extent of the new APA's procedural mandate to
agencies. The benefits of Amendment 1487 will be combined in the next
Part with some more express boundaries between courts and agencies in
order to shape a concrete proposal. In light of the lessons learned from all
four versions of Senate Bill 343, I believe that the proposal is a workable
replacement for the Chevron doctrine.
IV. Improving Upon Senate Bill 343: Determinacy Plus Deference
This Part looks to the strengths and weaknesses of the four versions
of Senate Bill 343 in order to formulate a system of judicial review of
agency statutory interpretations free of some of the faults1" that charac-
terize the present state of the Chevron doctrine.
An initial reason to be skeptical about any such proposal is the fact
that the indeterminacy and lack of precision in substantive-review doctrines
like the Chevron doctrine is a problem "that has plagued administrative law
since its inception."" A number of prominent writers have concluded
that tinkering with the scope of judicial review in the Chevron context is
at best fruitless, and at worst, counterproductive.19 Nevertheless, I
would contend that the effort to achieve more determinacy in judicial
review of agency statutory interpretations is a worthy one. If revisions to
the APA are drafted carefully and with one eye toward public opinion and
another toward functionality, the result could be productive and beneficial
in at least two ways. First, a more determinative system of judicial review
would increase the American public's confidence in and acceptance of the
system of administrative law. The importance of this benefit should not be
underestimated. While wrestling with inconsistent, irrational, or unfair
legal outcomes may serve as a valuable mental exercise for law students
and their professors, awareness of such systemic quirks is more likely to
be a source of anger and frustration for the nonlawyer. Second, perhaps
we really can get a consistently higher quality of decisions from our
196. See generally supra Part H.
197. Shapiro & Levy, supra note 116, at 1079.
198. For example, in reacting to a proposal by Professors Shapiro and Levy to amend the judicial
review provisions of the APA, Professor Levin expressed fear that "the authors' commitment to
'determinacy' has led them to endorse a plan that could have far worse consequences than the situation
it seeks to cure." Levin, Uncertain Appeal, supra note 36, at 1091 (responding to Shapiro & Levy,
supra note 116). Justice Stephen Breyer, writing about regulatory reform legislation several years
before he joined the Supreme Court, concluded that "at a minimum, ...legislative proposals that
simply try to lead the courts to exercise a more 'independent' judgment when reviewing agency
decisions offer little promise as a direction for meaningful regulatory reform." Stephen Breyer, Judicial
Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REv. 363, 397-98 (1986).
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government agencies under a more determinative judicial review system.
It is a foregone conclusion in this era of administrative agencies that
Congress can delegate vast amounts of power to departments of the execu-
tive branch by means of ambiguous enabling statutes. Because courts tradi-
tionally have the institutional expertise for dealing with questions of
statutory interpretation, and because agencies tend to possess expertise in
a given field and must implement policy by statutory interpretation, it
makes sense to find a determinate common ground on which these two
spheres of expertise can benefit each other.1
The proposal detailed in this Part contains five elements: (1) a specific
part of the agency rulemaking record devoted to the explanation of its
chosen statutory interpretation, (2) placement of the burden for presenting
alternative interpretations to a proposed rule on outside commentators, (3)
a "hard look" form of judicial review for rule challenges based on
permissible interpretations contained in the record, (4) broad deference to
agency statutory interpretations that satisfy the new procedural require-
ments, and (5) only prospective application of the new requirements. For
the most part, these ideas are culled from the four major versions of Senate
Bill 343-some directly, some tangentially. Taken as a whole, they
attempt to place the courts and agencies in complementary but limited roles
on questions of statutory interpretation, each institution drawing from its
inherent strengths. Although no system could eliminate unpredictability,
this one would be more determinative than the current system under the
Chevron doctrine.
A. A Rulemaking Record for Statutory Interpretation
First, an amended APA should require an agency rulemaking that
involves statutory interpretation to produce specific items related to that
interpretation for the rulemaking record. This proposal closely tracks
Amendment 1487,' although the Judiciary Committee bill contains some
related but less specific provisions." Specifically, the agency would
prepare an explanation of whether its interpretation is required or
permissible. This explanation would be published in the Federal Register
along with the proposed rule. It would include an invitation for comments
disputing the particular interpretation and suggesting specific alternatives.
At the final-rule stage, the agency would publish an explanation of reasons
199. The emphasis on the interpretive process in this Part implicitly assumes that most agency
delegated statutes contain ambiguities and would thus not reflect clear Congressional intent in a
"Chevron step-one" sense. The basis for this assumption is the fact that this proposal would not call
on courts to use "traditional tools of statutory construction" to determine clear Congressional intent.
See supra subpart H(A).
200. See supra notes 179-88 (quoting § 553 and § 706 of Amendment 1487).
201. See supra note 151 (quoting § 553(c) of the Judiciary Committee's version of S. 343).
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under the particular enabling statute why the interpretation embodied in its
final rule was chosen over the alternatives presented in written public
comments.
The usefulness of this documentation in later interpretive disputes
comes largely from its utilization under the remaining elements of this
reform proposal. Two benefits of this specialized record are nonetheless
noteworthy at the outset: it would satisfy the restrictions of the Chenery
rule,' which prohibits post-hoc rationalizations for agency actions, and
it would more efficiently focus the attention of all parties in statutory
interpretation disputes. Agencies today must already do business under
Chenery, so this first benefit is probably minimal.' The second benefit
is stronger only to the extent that litigants and reviewing courts would
voluntarily exclude items contained in the rulemaking record outside of this
particular documentation when making arguments and issuing decisions.
If, however, a statutory interpretation record is to be of any significant
value in reforming the Chevron doctrine, it ultimately must combine with
other requirements, such as those that follow.
B. The Public Burden for Alternative Interpretations
A second element that a revised APA should contain is an allocation
to the general public of the burden of producing alternative statutory
interpretations. This recommendation comes squarely from section
706(a)(2)(F) of Amendment 1487, which allows a reviewing court to set
aside an agency interpretation "without substantial support in the
rulemaking file, viewed as a whole."' Under both Amendment 1487
and the proposal in this Part, the rulemaking file must contain public
comments on the agency's interpretation and responses to those comments
explaining why a particular interpretation was not chosen. 5 If the
agency provides no explanation or an inadequate explanation for an
alternative proposed by public comment, then its rulemaking file as a
whole is lacking and the rule should be remanded. On the other hand, the
agency would bear no responsibility at all for dealing with statutory
202. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94-95 (1943); see also FPC v. Texaco, Inc., 417
U.S. 380, 397 (1974); supra text accompanying notes 129-30.
203. As Judge Wald of the D.C. Circuit has observed, "We are constrained by Chenery to look
at the agency rationale, not just the record itself, to decide if a rule is arbitrary and capricious, and
indeed ... we turn some back for failure to explain the rationale satisfactorily." Patricia M. Wald,
Judicial Review: Talking Points, 48 ADMIN. L. REv. 350, 352 (1996). The Judiciary Committee was
nevertheless concerned enough about agencies skirting the Chenery rule to address the matter in both
its statute and report. See S. RP. No. 104-90, at 53 (1995) ("Post hoc rationalizations serve to defeat
the purpose of notice and comment rulemakings by permitting the one-sided articulation or creation of
a 'rationale' without the opportunity for public examination or commentary.").
204. See supra note 188 (quoting § 706 of Amendment 1487).
205. See supra note 179 (quoting § 553 of Amendment 1487).
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interpretations that were never brought to its attention during the
rulemaking process.
Two ideas lie at the heart of this proposition. First, an otherwise
plausible interpretation of an ambiguous statute is not worth considering
unless it has at least some constituency among the general public. It is
appropriate to preclude judicial consideration of a permissible interpretation
that garnered zero support during the rulemaking process. Second, a
balance must exist between efficiency and finality of rulemaking on one
hand, and allowing an avenue for public input in areas where a statute
leaves open several policy options on the other.' Placing the burden of
presenting alternative statutory interpretations on the general public during
a specified window of time incorporates both of these ideas. During the
time a final rule is being formulated, all individuals and groups have the
opportunity to present their views of sound policy to the agency. The
agency must demonstrably consider these views and accept or reject them.
Not surprisingly, the more controversial and costly rules will attract more
input and those rulemakings will take longer, but that is arguably a
desirable result in a deliberative democracy.' The rules attracting less
interest will have a shorter rulemaking record that has fewer grounds on
which to later challenge the statutory interpretation. Over time, this
requirement that competing statutory interpretations be preserved during the
rulemaking process would tend to channel more intellectual resources into
rulemaking rather than subsequent litigation.
If the agency has explained the statutory interpretation embodied in its
rule and the deficiencies of the rejected alternatives, the record will not be
subject to attack on the basis of its omissions. Persons wishing to attack
the statutory interpretation of a rule must do so on the basis of a specific
alternative contained in the record, and the record would be closed on or
shortly after the issuance of a final rule. If this proposal is to be a
replacement for the Chevron doctrine, however, fundamental questions still
loom: what scope of judicial review is to apply when a litigant asserts that
an agency erred by not selecting an alternative interpretation that is in the
record? What about an attack based on an interpretation that is not in the
record?
C. The Specified Scope of "Hard Look" Judicial Review
The report of the Senate Judiciary Committee asserts that courts play
an important and active role in the modern administrative state in
206. See supra note 37 (describing a tension between deliberativeness and efficiency).
207. See Phillip J. Hatter, The APA at 50: A Celebration, Not a Puzzlement, ADMIN. & REa. L.
NEws, Winter 1996, at 2, 2 (asserting that a fundamental value embodied in APA rulemaking
procedure is that it "provides a democratic means by which the people who will be affected, either by
being regulated or as a beneficiary, or even as a 'do-gooder,' can participate in the decision").
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determining whether an agency's statutory interpretation is a reasonable
policy choice."° Yet deference advocates are correct when they note that
the policy decision embodied in such an interpretation is not a "question
of law" in the traditional sense.' Treating it as such defeats many of
the efficiency concerns that led Congress to delegate authority to an agency
to begin with. Any plausible scope-of-review proposal needs to find a
means to balance these concerns.210
When an agency's enabling statute is susceptible to more than one
interpretation and the agency's chosen interpretation is challenged in court,
this proposal would require one of two possible scopes of review. The
first, described in this subpart, would apply when the basis for the chal-
lenge is an alternative statutory interpretation that was actually proposed to
the agency and was therefore addressed by the agency in the Federal
Register. In such a situation, express evidence reveals a statutory
interpretation contrary to the one proposed by the agency. Evidence also
exists that the contrary interpretation has a constituency. Under such
circumstances, the court should engage in a "hard look" review of the
agency's choice between the competing interpretations.
Unlike most standards of review, the name of the hard look review
refers to the analysis expected from the agency rather than from the
court. The role of the court is to determine whether the agency itself
has taken a hard look at the relevant policy alternatives under the statute
and has made a reasoned exercise of discretion in making its actual
choice.212 In such a case, the reviewing court looks to the explanation
given in the rulemaking record and determines whether the agency
explained and justified its interpretive decision in light of suggested
208. See S. REP. No. 104-90, at 107 (1995).
209. See, e.g., 1 DAvIS & PIERCE, supra note 60, § 3.3 (asserting that when Congress leaves a
policy dispute open to agency resolution by statutory construction, the agency is not resolving an issue
of "law," but is rather resolving an issue of "policy").
210. See Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification: Rethinking Recent Proposals to Modify
JudicialReview of Notice and Comment Rulemaing, 75 TExAs L. REV. 483,523-24(1997) (asserting
that hard look review serves a valuable function if its application is restricted based upon "signals from
interested parties, the regulators themselves, and Congress about what issues raised by a challenge to
a rulemaking are significant"). But see Thomas 0. McGarity, The Courts and the Ossification of
Rulemaking: A Response to Professor Seidenfeld, 75 TEXAS L. REV. 525, 553-56 (1997) (contending
that restrictions on the use of hard look review would do little to influence judges "with an anti-
government ideological perspective").
211. Judge Leventhal of the D.C. Circuit is generally credited with announcing this formulation
of hard look review in Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C.Cir. 1970).
See Seidenfeld, supra note 37, at 128-29 ("[T]he 'hard look' test. . . asks courts to steep themselves
in agency policy and the substantive debate framing the issue under consideration to ensure that the
agency below gave a 'hard look' to all factors relevant to its decision."). As used here, hard look
would not apply to "all factors" relevant to the agency's statutory interpretation, but only to those
factors brought to its attention in the public comment stage of the rulemaking process.
212. See BtEYER & STEWART, supra note 194, at 363-64.
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alternatives. Under this proposal, a court would engage in a hard look
review process using only the specific parts of the agency record that deal
with statutory interpretation, and then by comparing the agency's chosen
interpretation with only the one asserted as the better alternative by the
party challenging the rule. 3
Judicial economy would be enhanced by the fact that both the court
and the challengers to a rulemaking would be limited in the materials to
which they could refer for review of the agency's statutory interpretation.
Both courts and agencies would engage in the process, but their respective
roles would be more carefully defined. After the court finds that an
enabling statute is ambiguous and that the record contains an alternative to
the agency position advocated by the litigant, a challenge may be based
only upon claims that the agency failed at the final rule stage to explain
why its chosen statutory interpretation is superior to others suggested by
written comment. The analysis in which courts would participate would
bring the judicial expertise in statutory interpretation into the rulemaking
process. 14 The agency's policymaking expertise would have entered the
process in its response to proposed alternative explanations contained in the
rulemaking record.
An interpretation might be "superior" based on consideration of cost-
benefit analysis or risk analysis, but these would not necessarily be
required. Although the prior examination of Senate Bill 343's statutory
interpretation provisions in this Note was necessarily made in the shadow
of cost-benefit analysis and risk analysis, these are issues independent of
the scope of review." 5 Indeed, this process would just as easily permit
agencies and courts to examine the policy rationale behind a rule within the
context of the particular enabling statute that produced it.2"6
D. Broad Judicial Deference to Satisfactory Procedures
The fourth part of this regulatory reform proposal addresses the
situation in which a regulation is challenged on the basis of an alternative
statutory interpretation that is not contained in the rulemaking record.
Under such circumstances, a reviewing court should give the agency's
213. The party challenging the rule need not be the same person who actually proposed the
competing statutory interpretation to the agency. The fact that someone was interested enough to
propose the particular alternative asserted in the litigation means that it had a constituency, and that it
is proper for the court to examine the agency's explanation of the competing interpretations.
214. See Seidenfeld, supra note 210, at 521 ("[J]udges are experienced in spotting weakness in
factual support and soft spots in logical reasoning.").
215. See Levin, Lessons of 1995, supra note 36, at 649 (setting aside cost-benefit analysis issues
and asserting that S. 343's judicial review provisions "deserve comment in their own right").
216. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The APA and Regulatory Refonn, 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 81,
85 (1996) (arguing that Congress should amend or repeal burdensome provisions of particular
regulatory statutes if it wants to affect regulatory policy).
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interpretation the most extensive deference. Unlike the ambiguity in the
Chevron doctrine, however, this command to give deference should be in
the clearest and most unequivocal terms. The express limitations of the
Governmental Affairs bill are the model for this clarity, even though that
bill did not address the Chevron issue.
Bowing to political realities, the Governmental Affairs version of
Senate Bill 343 contains some very clear limiting language in its cost-
benefit analysis provisions: "The requirements of this subchapter shall not
alter the criteria for rulemaking otherwise applicable under other
statutes." 21 7 The concern addressed in this language is that judges should
not have free reign to substitute their own view of proper cost-benefit
analysis so as to contradict an agency's particular enabling statute. The
role that judges play in the rulemaking process is potentially much greater
in the Chevron context of agency statutory interpretation. If specific parts
of the process by which an agency interprets its enabling statute are subject
to hard-look judicial review, then efficiency considerations demand that the
rest of the process include strong protection against judicial interference.
In a sense, the fourth element of this regulatory reform proposal is
merely the flip side of the third. After a statute enacting this proposal set
the parameters of hard-look review, as in subpart IV(C), it would then
explicitly require deference on all other questions related to statutory
interpretation. As in the broadest readings of Chevron, courts would allow
any reasonable interpretation by the agency to stand. Unlike the deferential
version of Chevron, however, courts would engage in hard-look review of
areas implicated in the rulemaking record.
E. Prospective Applicability of Regulatory Reform
One threshold problem that arises from any new regulatory-review
process is what to do with the thousands of pages of regulations that were
promulgated before the new process is put in place. The records
supporting these rules would obviously not contain the substantive
information required by a revised APA. Should they all be declared
invalid if challenged in court? Assuming that the best answer to this
question is no, the fifth part of this reform proposal seeks to change the
system without destabilizing it.
This replacement for the Chevron doctrine would have only
prospective application and would thus not apply to regulations predating
the APA revision. Amendment 1487 was not expressly prospective in its
application, but it had a plausible reading that would allow such an
217. See supra note 171 (quoting § 622(h) of the Governmental Affairs Committee bill).
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interpretation." 8 A clearer wording of this idea is a necessary part of
this reform proposal. Prospective applicability adds a considerable amount
of stability to an otherwise sweeping overhaul of the system. It sets up a
long-term process for converting judicial review of statutory interpretations
into an "in-the-record" system in place of the Chevron inquiry.
The five elements described in this Part, taken together, would
markedly change American administrative law. When the dust settled, a
system would be in place that focuses courts and agencies in complemen-
tary and specifically defined roles, dealing with a limited set of issues
related to statutory interpretation. This proposal would improve upon the
Chevron doctrine in ways that should (but probably will not) please
advocates for both of Chevron's major readings. For deference advocates,
a rule would be in place that provides consistent deference to the agency
as a background norm. Current Chevron deference is far from consistent.
For judicial oversight advocates, an important part of the rulemaking
record would be open to hard-look review. Also, the number of plausible
challenges that could be brought before the judiciary would be decreased
by eliminating interpretations that had no demonstrable constituency, thus
making judicial review more focused and effective.
V. Conclusion
Perhaps Justice Frankfurter best stated the difficulty of pinning down
the scope of judicial review in any litigation context when he wrote that
"[tihere are no talismanic words that can avoid the process of
judgment."" 9 Karl Llewellyn's famous table of opposing canons of
statutory construction also vividly illustrates the impossibility-even if one
wanted to do it-of achieving totally mechanized judicial review.'
There will always be some play in the joints of the American legal system,
no less in the review of agency decisions than anywhere else, but agency-
administered statutes are particularly problematic because they raise
fundamental concerns about governmental abuse of discretion under the
guise of efficiency.
Although all four versions of Senate Bill 343 contain serious flaws, the
legislation debated in the Senate in 1995 contains useful concepts for
improving upon the existing Chevron doctrine by revising the APA. The
system outlined in this Note takes steps in the right direction by directing
more effective utilization of both court and agency institutional expertise
in the rulemaking and statutory interpretation process. Moreover, the
proposal in this Note tends to satisfy two criteria that are necessary for any
218. See supra subpart M(D).
219. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 489 (1951).
220. See Llewellyn, supra note 58, at 401-06.
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statutory reform of the Chevron doctrine to be successful. t  First, it
would lead to increased determinacy in this important area of the law and
would thereby lead to greater systemic confidence among the American
public. Second, the more intense, yet expressly limited judicial scrutiny
of the rulemaking record could result in statutory interpretations and
agency rules that better reflect the policy concerns of the interested public.
Given the present chaos in Chevron jurisprudence, this type of new system
of judicial review for agency statutory interpretations is a risk worth
taking.
-Mark Burge
221. See supra text accompanying notes 196-99.
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